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1CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Discrete Event Systems
This dissertation is a study of a special class of systems, discrete-event systems, which is a
good model for many systems that contain discrete changes. Even the continuous systems are
sometimes modeled approximately into discrete-event systems on purpose for easy study. In
recent years, more and more efforts are put on the research of discrete-event systems due to
their wide use. Examples of discrete-event systems include communication channels, computer
networks, manufacturing systems, etc.
1.1.1 The Concept of Discrete-Event Systems
Before going into the detail of discrete-event systems, it is necessary to first introduce the
definition of event. But, to mention ”event”, it is also necessary to give the definition of state
first. A state of a system is a unique configuration of information that can be used, together
with system inputs, to determine the system output. For a simple example, a light bulb can
have two states, ON and OFF. With the actions we put on the switch, we can implement the
transitions between these two states. These actions are events.
It is hard to give the strict definition, but generally an event is thought to occur instan-
taneously and cause transition from one state to another[Cassandras, C. G. and Lafortune,
S. (1999)]. An event should be identified with a specific action, e.g. turning on/off the switch,
the arrival of a customer in a queue. The time of the occurrence of the event sometimes is not
so important, depending on the type of the system.
A Discrete-Event System (DES) is a dynamic system which evolves according to asyn-
chronous occurrence of certain discrete changes (events) [Kumar, R. and Garg, V. K. (1995)].
2Examples of discrete-event systems include many man-made systems such as computer and
communication networks, robotics and manufacturing systems, and automated traffic system.
A DES has a discrete set of states which, unlike a physical system, may take symbolic values
rather then real values, for example, a machine is either idle, working or broken. States tran-
sitions in such systems occur at asynchronous discrete instants of time in response to events.
Model of DESs can be classified into untimed and timed models based on whether they ignore
the timing information. The untimed models have information about order of state and event
pairs, but not about their timing. Untimed models are used to control and coordinate orderly
occurrence of states and events so that the system under study meets certain qualitative goals
[Kumar, R. and Garg, V. K. (1995)]. In this thesis, we are concerned with studying only the
untimed models.
From the definition above, we can see that the discrete-event system has two basic proper-
ties:
1. The set of states is discrete.
2. The state transition is event-driven.
The first property differentiates DES with continuous-state system. The second property
indicates that the system can only change at discrete points, which are the occurrences of
asynchronously generated discrete events. Discrete-event system models many real systems.
Even if a system is not a discrete-state system, for the study interests, it may be helpful to have
a discrete-state point of view. An example is power system. Even it is continuous, it is easy
to analyze the system behavior if we describe it as a discrete-event system with many working
states. In this dissertation, a simplified power system will be modeled into a discrete-event
system to analyze its behavior after some faults and to synthesize the control actions.
Here is another simple example of discrete event system. Suppose we have an elevator
in a three-story building. The elevator connects the first, the second and the third floor.
Naturally, in the discrete event model of the elevator, there are three discrete states, each of
which represents a different floor that the elevator will stop at. From lower floor to higher floor,
31 2 3
move up move up
move downmove down
Figure 1.1 The discrete event model of the elevator
the action is moving up, and to the opposite direction, the action is moving down. Figure 1.1
illustrates the discrete event model of the elevator. Circles are the states, with the numbers
representing the floors. Arrows are the transitions, and the names of the transition actions are
next to the arrows.
1.2 Fault Tolerance
1.2.1 Introduction
In modern world, people rely more and more on the availability and reliability of the com-
plex systems. An small error in the system may cause a disaster. An example is the traffic light
systems. The traffic lights are supposed to work continuously and correctly. The malfunction
of the traffic light, such as stop functioning or false directing, may lead to an unnecessary jam
or serious accidents. For some projects involving human lives, the dependability is extremely
critical due to the serious consequences.
With the development of industry, people pay more and more effort on studying trusty
systems. Systems are expected to work dependably under anticipation. The concept of de-
pendable computing first appeared in 1830s [Aviz˘ienis, A. and Laprie, J.-C. and Randell,
B. (2000)]. After the invention of electronic computer, practical techniques were used to im-
prove its reliability. The concept of failure-tolerant system was introduced by W.H. Pierce in
1965 [Pierce, W. H. (1965)]. The research on the fault-tolerant system develops fast, since
people rely more and more on the machines. Although it may be expensive to use fault-
tolerant techniques, they are applied in aircrafts and railway systems, due to the extremely
high cost that failures may cause in transportation. Fault-tolerant software are applied in a
lot of well-known projects, such as Ariane 5, Airbus A-320, Boeing B-777, Elektra Austrian
4railway signaling system, French train systems, NASA space shuttle, etc. [Voas, J. (2001)].
1.2.2 The Concepts about Fault Tolerance
1.2.2.1 Dependability
Fault tolerance is used to enhance the dependability of the system. Dependability is a
composed concept, which contains four attributes: reliability, availability, safety and security
[Jalote, P. (1998)].
• Reliability is the ability of a system, when it is needed, to perform its service correctly.
• Availability means the system is available to perform its service when it is needed.
• Safety is a characteristic that qualifies the ability to avoid catastrophic failures that
might involve human life or excessive costs.
• Security is the ability of a system to prevent unauthorized access.
Fault tolerance is the ability of a system to work correctly, even in case that some compo-
nents can not behave as desired. The purpose is to prove reliability and availability, such that
the system can work continuously and correctly. Although fault tolerance does not have direct
relation with safety and security, some researches [Weber, D. G. (1989)] can still make them
associated. A system can either be safe but not fault-tolerant, such as fail-safe systems which
fail in a safe state, or fault-tolerant but not safe, such as non-masking fault-tolerant systems,
which may temporarily enter an unsafe state after a fault occurs.
1.2.2.2 Faults
There are three kinds of threats to the dependability: failure, error and fault. Although
these three concepts are used undistinguished in many articles, it is necessary to make it clear
of the difference between them. A failure occurs when an actual running system deviates from
its specified behavior. An error is the part of the system state that is liable to lead to a failure.
A fault is the cause of an error. For example, a stuck-at-zero fault occurs on one bit in the
5memory. It has no harm as long as that bit is not used, or only value 0 is restored. This fault
may cause an error when value 1 is restored. And, it becomes a failure if this bit is read. It is
clear that these three threats have decreasing level of catastrophic influences on the systems.
That’s why so many efforts has been put on handling faults in order to prevent them becoming
failures.
Faults can be categorized into various classes, according to diverse attributes and sources.
Table 1.1 shows the classification according to some criteria.
Table 1.1 Fault classification
Duration transient, persistent, intermittent
Cause design, operational
Behavior crash, omission, timing, Byzantine
The last classification is made according to the behavior of the failed system. A crash fault
will cause the component to halt. An omission fault makes the component not to respond to
some inputs. If the component responds to the inputs either too early or too late, it has a
timing fault. And a Byzantine fault will lead the component to behave in an arbitrary manner.
Unlike the other classifications, the classes in this classification are not disjoint. A crash fault
is also an omission fault, and omission fault is a special case of timing fault. The class of
Byzantine fault contains all kinds of faults, such that the component with Byzantine fault
may have any kind of behavior, which makes the Byzantine fault the most difficult to cope
with. Therefore, if a fault-tolerant system can take care of Byzantine faults, it has the ability
to deal with any kind of faults. [Lamport, L. and Shostak, R. and Pease, M. (1980)] is
the first paper published about the Byzantine faults. Later, [Lamport, L. and Shostak, R.
and Pease, M. (1982)] has a systematic study of the Byzantine general problem, which helps
to manage Byzantine faults in distributed components. With respect to the same number of
faults, the study continues to reduce the number of rounds in reaching the agreement, as well
as to reduce the algorithm’s complexity in communication and computation. [Berman, P. and
Garay, J. A. and Kerry, K. J. (1989)], [Berman, P. and Garay, J. A. (1991)] etc. made some
6improvement on [Lamport, L. and Shostak, R. and Pease, M. (1980)], while [Garay, J. A.
and Moses, Y. (1998)], with polynomial complexity, reached agreement in t+1 rounds among
3t+ 1 components, where t is the number of faults.
Since faults may cause undesired deviation of the system, how to deal with the faults is
the core problem in building a reliable system. Fault handling is a technique that covers a
wide range of method to treat with the faults. It includes fault prevention (fault avoidance),
fault tolerance, fault removal and fault forecasting [Aviz˘ienis, A. and Laprie, J.-C. and
Randell, B. (2000)]. Different from fault tolerance, in which the system works with some
failed components, fault prevention is achieved during deliberate design and manufacturing,
and fault removal is to remove faults before they lead to disastrous accidents, while fault
forecasting is to predict possible faults by concurrently evaluating the system performance.
1.2.2.3 Fault Tolerance
To provide fault tolerance, it is necessary for the system to have redundancy. Redundancy is
the key to support fault tolerance, such that there can be no fault tolerance without redundancy
[Gartner, F. C. (1999)]. Redundancy is defined as those parts of the system that are not
needed for the correct functioning of the system [Jalote, P. (1998)]. There can be hardware
redundancy (such as backup components) or software redundancy (such as reconfiguration
algorithms). Since the system needs time to handle the faults after being aware of them, time
redundancy, that is extra execution time, is also necessary.
In many cases, software and hardware are tied in achieving fault tolerance. In fact, hard-
ware redundancy nearly always employs software redundancy. Although the names look simi-
lar, there are quite big differences between software fault-tolerance (fault-tolerant computing)
and hardware fault-tolerance. [Laprie, J.-C. and Arlat, J. and Beounes, C. and Kanoun,
K. (1990)] presents the comparison and contrast of them in architecture. Table 1.2 gives the
contrast of them in other aspects.
In the presence of faults, different fault-tolerant systems may have different performance,
according to the techniques they use. Three different types of fault tolerance are listed below.
7Table 1.2 Software fault tolerance vs. Hardware fault tolerance
Hardware FT Software FT
Types of faults physical faults design faults
Origins of failures hardware defects design/implementation defects
Ways to tolerant faults forward/backward recovery design diversity
• Masking tolerance: Both safety and liveness are satisfied in the presence of faults.
• Non-Masking tolerance: Safety may be violated temporarily.
• Fail-Safe Tolerance: Only safety is satisfied in the presence of faults.
Fault masking has several backups for a single component, and uses normal components to
”mask” the faulty components, preventing them from affecting the correct performance of the
system. Fault masking is a widely used technique because of its simpleness and convenience.
Well-known examples include Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) and Redundant Array of
Inexpensive Disks (RAID). According to the status of the backups during working, the backups
can be hot standby, cold standby or warm standby [Selic, B. (2002)]. The advantage of fault
masking is that the system can work continuously and safely after fault happens, but the cost
may be expensive.
Unlike masking fault tolerance, non-masking does not use backups. After fault isolation,
reconfiguration techniques are used to recover the system to normal performance. A controller
is needed to guide the recovery within some given specifications. Non-masking fault toler-
ance provides liveness, but the system may violate safety specification during recovery, and
the system performance may satisfy only a lower level of specification after recovery, which
is known as graceful degradation. Note that masking fault tolerance guarantees liveness, but
non-masking fault tolerance only guarantees it eventually. The advantage of non-masking fault
tolerance is that, although it is strictly weaker than masking fault tolerance, it can still be used
in cases when masking fault tolerance is too costly to implement or even provably impossi-
ble [Gartner, F. C. (1999)]. An interesting example is Denmark Ørsted project [Gartner,
F. C. (1999)], where using hardware redundancy to obtain a fail-safe design is impossible,
8due to cost and weight constraints. In addition, operator intervention from ground is limited
to periods when the satellite passes Denmark. There is a 13-hour interval, during which the
satellite is unattended. In this situation, autonomous fault tolerant control is a right choice.
Fail safe tolerance, that is failing in safe state, is another kind of property. Fail-stop
processors have been studied since 1980’s [Schlichting, R. D. and Schneider, F. B. (1983)],
[Schneider, F. B. (1983)]. Instead of keeping on working after fault, they simply ceases
functioning to preserve safety. It sacrifices liveness to ensure safety. Since the fail-safe systems
stop working when a fault occurs, it is a weaker form of fault tolerance, such that it is still
disputed (e.g. [Blanke, M. and Staroswiecki, M. and Wu, N. E. (2001)], [Blanke, M. and
Izadi-Zamanabadi, R. and Bogh, S. A. and Lunau, C. P. (1997)],[Voas, J. (2001)]) whether
fail-safe is a subset of fault tolerance. Since safety is more preferable than liveness, fail-safe
tolerance is still an advisable technique, used, for example, in the ground control system of the
Ariane 5 space missile project [Dega, J.-L. (1996)].
1.3 Fault Tolerant Control
Fault-tolerant control integrates diagnosis with control methods to handle faults. The aim
of fault-tolerant control is to prevent faults from being developed into serious failures ,and
therefore increase the availability and reliability of the system and reduce the risk of loss.
Various methods of fault-tolerant control have been developed. Most of fault-tolerant control
methods share a common structure, which is depicted in Figure 1.2 [Blanke, M. and Kinnaert,
M. and Lunze, J. and Staroswiecki, M. (2003)]:
A supervisor is added in fault-tolerant control, which contains the diagnostic block and
controller re-design block. The re-design block uses diagnosed information of the fault and
adjusts the controller accordingly. The re-design of the controller may change the controller
parameters, or give a new controller configuration. The single arrows represent signals, and
the double arrow refers information flow.
Without fault, the system runs mainly in the execution level. The nominal controller,
which is designed for the faultless system, attenuates the disturbance d and ensures set-point
9Figure 1.2 The architecture of fault-tolerant control
following and other requirements on the closed-loop system. In this situation, the diagnostic
block recognizes that the closed-loop system is faultless and no change of the execution is
necessary. If a fault f occurs, the supervision level makes the control loop fault-tolerant. The
diagnostic block identifies the fault and the controller re-design block adjusts the controller to
the new situation. Afterwards, the execution level alone continues to satisfy the control aims
[Blanke, M. and Kinnaert, M. and Lunze, J. and Staroswiecki, M. (2003)].
1.3.1 Controller Re-Design
In case of faults, the controller re-design block will compute the next controller from the
diagnosis result. There are two kinds of controller re-design methods: fault accommodation
and control reconfiguration.
In fault accommodation, the controller parameters are adapted to the dynamical properties
of the faulty plant. Before and after fault accommodation, the input and output of the plant
used in the control loop remain the same. A simple way of fault accommodation is to use
predesigned controllers, which are selected off-line for a specific fault. The re-design step is
to switch among different control laws. This step is quick and can meet strong real-time
constraints. However, it is for small systems, otherwise it is difficult to design in advance for
all possible faults before the system starts operating, and hard to store all possible controllers
in the control software (see more in [Blanke, M. and Kinnaert, M. and Lunze, J. and
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Staroswiecki, M. (2003)]).
Because it is fast and real-time, fault accommodation is used in many applications. The
method using fault accommodation is called fault adaptive control. Some recent works are
about fault adaptive control. A switching hybrid model is used in [Abdelwahed, S. and Wu,
J. and Biswas, G. and Ramirez, J. and Manders, E. (2005)] to represent the dynamics
of the system components and their interactions, and a controller scheme is designed and
implemented for efficient resource management in Advanced Life Support Systems. In [Ji, M.
and Zhang, Z. and Biswas, G. and Sarkar, N. (2003)], a hierarchical control accommodation
framework is developed. It provides switching stability among a set of trajectory tracking
controllers. Fault-adaptive control can also be found in many applications, such as aircraft
fuel systems [Karsai, G. and Biswas, G. and Pasternak, T. and Narasimhan, S. and Pecili,
G. and Simon, G. and Kovacshazy, T. (2001)], [Simon, G. and Karsai, G. and Biswas, G.
and Abdelwahed, S. and Mahadevan, N. and Szemethy, T. and Pecili, G. and Kovacshazy,
T. (2003)],aircraft roll control systems [Simon, G. and Kovacshazy, T. and Pecili, G. and
Szemethy, T. and Karsai, G. and Ledeczi, A. (2002)].
When fault accommodation is impossible, the entire control loop need to be reconfigured.
The input-output relations between controller and plant are changed. Reconfiguration includes
the selection of a new control configuration where alternative input and output signals are
used. The selection of these signals depends upon the existing faults. A new control law
has to be designed on-line. The necessity of control reconfiguration becomes obvious when
sensor or actuator faults are considered. If these components fail completely, the fault leads
to a breakdown of the control loop. There is no possibility to adapt the controller by simply
adjusting its parameters. Instead, alternative actuators or sensors have to be found, which are
not affected by the fault and which have similar interactions with the plant so that a reasonably
selected controller is able to satisfy the performance specifications on the closed-loop system
(see more in [Blanke, M. and Kinnaert, M. and Lunze, J. and Staroswiecki, M. (2003)]).
Although controller reconfiguration is more complicated than fault accommodation, it is
still a hot topic in research and application for its strong adaptability. [Looze, D. and Weiss,
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J. and Eterno, J. and Barrett, N. (2005)] focuses on the approach of automatic re-design of
flight control system based on linear quadratic techniques, which maximizes the feedback sys-
tem performance subject to a bandwidth constraint. [Elgersma, M. and Glavas˘ki, S. (2001)]
develops a distributed failure detection and isolation system for commuter and business air-
craft. Nonlinear continuous/discrete systems are studied. The failure detection, isolation and
recovery technique includes both discrete mode changes and continuous parameter values. [Liu,
J. and Darabi, H. (2004)] develops a framework for reconfiguration of a discrete event system
controller, which has a dynamic event observation set. Upon a change in the observation set,
there is a mega-controller, which reconfigures the controller by a aggregation or disaggregation
of the controller states.
1.3.2 Formal Verification
Starting from 1970’s, formal methods for the design and analysis have been applied. In
1980’s, they are firstly used in fault tolerance [Moitra, A. and Joseph, M. (1983)], [Schlichting,
R. D. and Schneider, F. B. (1983)]. Formal verification is used in system design [Bernardeschi,
C. and Fantechi, A. and Simoncini, L. (2000)], mostly in fault-tolerant computing systems,
to confirm that fault tolerance is achieved. Examples of such systems include concurrent and
real-time systems, communication networks and process control systems. For those systems,
fault tolerance, as well as timing, has been thought to be implementing issues of them, different
from the safety and liveness properties [Liu, Z. and Joseph, M. (1999)].
Currently, most researches of formal verification of fault tolerance are for fault tolerant
computing. [Liu, Z. and Joseph, M. (1996)] shows how stepwise refinement [Abadi, M. and
Lamport, L. (1988)], with the help of transformation, can be used for the development of
fault-tolerant system, with or without timing constraints. The advantage of this approach is
that the specification and verification techniques can be used for programs, as well as fault-
tolerant systems. In [Liu, Z. and Joseph, M. (1999)], the authors study the relationship
between fault tolerance and schedulability, because they affect each other and both affect the
functionality and timing of the program. A framework is provided for such relation and for
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formal development of safety-critical and/or timing critical computing systems. Two kinds of
timers are used in the program, which makes the automated verification feasible. [Lincoln, P.
and Rushby, J. (1993)] focuses on the algorithm for reliably distributing single-source data
to multiple channels in the presence of faults. In [Ayache, S. and Conguet, E. and Humbert,
P. and Rodriguez, C. and Sifakis, J. and Gerlich, R. (1996)], it tries to solve the problem of
applicability of formal method to the world of space avionics computing. A general framework
is proposed for the early validation of fault tolerance provisions in a complex computerized
system.
1.4 Fault Detection and Fault Diagnosis
To maintain the correct performance, it is important to detect the faults as soon as possible,
so that there will be enough time to apply corresponding measures before the faults turn into
failures. Fault detection and diagnosis are important, since the faults in the components, such
as sensors and actuators, are associated with potential damages and costs, which increase with
time. Early and accurate detection of faults helps to avoid loss of human life and money. In
fact, detection mechanisms alone can suffice to provide safety. Therefore, detection plays a
crucial part in fault tolerance.
1.4.1 FMEA in System Design
Before thinking about the fault detection and diagnosis, there are some other things we
need to consider first. What are the possible faults in the system? What are the effects of
them? Which of them are critical for the dependability of the system? Which symptoms
are essential for us to detect those faults? After those questions being answered, the step of
detection can be developed without being aimless.
Other areas of system design employ standard patterns for design, and rules for the quality
management of a development are well established. Fault-tolerant control development can
benefit from similar procedures. The first step in the systematic design [Blanke, M. (1996)]
is a component-based Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA). The FMEA analysis deals
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with component faults and the propagation of fault effects. Components are such as sensors,
controllers, and actuator motors. FMEA analysis is commonly required for safety-critical
systems. The result of the FMEA analysis is thus a specification of which faults should be
detected, and what reactions should be imposed on the system when certain patterns of fault
effects are observed by the supervisor. The completeness of correctness properties of the design
method are critical in daring to take this step. For more details, see [Blanke, M. and Izadi-
Zamanabadi, R. and Bogh, S. A. and Lunau, C. P. (1997)].
1.4.2 Fault Detection
Fault detection, just as its name implies, is to indicate that something is wrong in the
system. It is an old topic in design. A lot of fault detection researches have been done in
dynamic systems. The first major survey is provided by Willsky in 1976 [Willsky, A. S. (1976)],
which is later followed by some other good surveys [Isermann, R. (1984)], [Gertle, J. J. (1988)].
Fault detecting, simply speaking, tries to abstract useful information from the set of the
system output. Usually, a fixed subset of the system output is used to detect some specific
system faults. For example, an abrupt increase of current in one element is a potential indicator
of the short circuit of that element.
One way to detect faults is to delicately choose a set of system output, such that, if a
fault occurs, it can be detected by calculating the output, where some predefined system
inputs are used. The difficulty in this method is to find an output set to detect a fault. In
distributed systems, detection of predicates in faulty environment has studied [Garg, V. K.
and Mitchell, J. R. (1998)], [Chase, C. M. and Garg, V. K. (1998)], [Gartner, F. C. and
Kloppenburg, S. (2000)]. Another example is analytic redundancy. Till now, quite many
practical examples have applied fault detection techniques, using analytical redundancy [Chow,
E. Y. and Willsky, A. S. (1984)], [Cunningham, T. B. and Poyneer, R. D. (1977)], [Shapiro,
E. Y. and Decarli, H. E. (1979)], [Stuckenberg, N. (1985)], [Merrill, M. C. (1985)]. Analytical
redundancy (AR) [Chow, E. Y. and Willsky, A. S. (1984)] is a fault detection method that
allows the explicit derivation of the maximum possible number of linearly independent system
14
model based consistency tests for a system [Leuschen, M. L. and Walker, I. D. and Cavallaro,
J. R. (2005)]. Using a linear model of the system of interest, AR exploits the null-space of the
state-space observability matrix to allow the creation of a set of test residuals [Chow, E. Y. and
Willsky, A. S. (1984)]. Given a system model, residual is the difference between the system
output and the model output. These residuals use sensor data histories and known control
inputs to detect any deviation from the static or dynamic behaviors of the model in real time
[Leuschen, M. L. and Walker, I. D. and Cavallaro, J. R. (2005)].
Another way is to artificially add some checks to the system, which will directly indicate
the occurrence of faults. Some common techniques are:
• Replication checks Multiple replicas of a component are running simultaneously. The
outputs of the replicas are compared and any discrepancy is an indication of a fault,
supposing all the processes are deterministic. The particular form of this check, in
hardware, is TMR, while, in software, it is N-version programming.
• Timing checks It is for timing faults. Timers are used to detect the termination of a
process. If a timer times out, a timing faults happens. The choice of the time needs to be
taken seriously, since setting the timer too tightly or too loosely may harm the accuracy
of the detection.
• Rum-time constraints checks Certain constraints are set to some variables. For
example, as long as the boundary values of variables are not being exceeded, there is no
fault. But code and performance overhead will be introduced, since the variables and
the boundaries are compared at run time.
1.4.3 Fault Diagnosis
Compared with fault detection, fault diagnosis is a more complex task, which consists of
determining the type, size and location of the faults as well as its time of detection [Patton,
R. J. and Frank, P. M. and Clark, R. N. (2000)]. For fault tolerant control, the location
and the magnitude of the fault need to be determined in order to decide the appropriate way
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of controller re-design or system reconfiguration. Fault diagnosis has been a research area
for many years, and the theory is well established [Patton, R. J. and Frank, P. and Clarke,
D. (1989)], [Gertler, J. (1995)]. [Patton, R. (1993)] gives an overview of available approaches,
[Basseville, M. and Nikiforov, I. (1994)] treats the detection problem from a statistical point
of view, [Sampath, M. and Sengupta, R. and Lafortune, S. and Sinnamohideen, K. and
Teneketzis, D. C. (1996)] provides an analysis of fault-diagnostic control using discrete-event
analysis.
Normally, diagnosis is composed of three steps:
• Fault detection Decide whether a fault has occurred. The time when the fault happens
is determined in this step.
• Fault isolation Decide which component in the system has a fault. The location of the
fault is determined.
• Fault identification Identify the fault and estimate its magnitude. This step is to
determine what kind of fault has occurred.
In application, a dynamical system with input u and output y is subjected to some fault
f . The system behavior depends on the fault f ∈ F where the element f0 of the set F stands
for the faultless case. The diagnostic system obtains the I/O pair (U,Y), which contains the
sequences of input and output values sampled at discrete time points. The diagnostic problem
to be solved is that, for a given I/O pair (U,Y), find the fault f. The problem concerns on-line
diagnosis based on the available measurement data. No inspection on the process is possible.
And the diagnostic problem has to meet real-time constraints accompanied with the system.
Most of the existing different diagnostic methods follow a common principle, called consistency-
based diagnosis, which can be explained by using the notion of the system behavior. The idea
of consistency-based diagnosis can be explained by means of Figure 1.3 [Blanke, M. and Kin-
naert, M. and Lunze, J. and Staroswiecki, M. (2003)]. The behavior B is a subset of the
space U × Y of all possible combinations of input and output signals. The dot A represents a
single I/O pair, where C = (uC , yC) represents a pair that is not consistent with the system
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Figure 1.3 The graphical illustration of the system behavior
dynamics. That is, for the input uC , the system produces an output y 6= yC , then the fault
is detectable. This is the principle of consistency-based diagnosis [Blanke, M. and Kinnaert,
M. and Lunze, J. and Staroswiecki, M. (2003)].
The diagnostic method tests whether the measurement (U, Y ) is consistent with the nominal
system behavior. If the faulty system produces the I/O pair that is still in B, no inconsistency
occurs despite of the fault. Therefore the fault is not detectable. The question of whether a
certain fault can be detected concerns the diagnosability of the system.
Fault diagnosis can be categorized into two methods: model based and non-model based.
Model-based methods compare the observed behavior with model to detect the faults, while
non-model based methods match the observed behavior to known faults. For discrete event
systems, a certain model based approach for failure diagnosis is proposed in [Sampath, M.
and Sengupta, R. and Lafortune, S. and Sinnamohideen, K. and Teneketzis, D. C. (1995)],
and get extended in [Qiu, W. (2005)], [Debouk, R. and Lafortune, S. and Teneketzis,
D. (2000)], [Jiang, S. and Kumar, R. (2002)], [Jiang, S. and Kumar, R. (2003)], [Jiang,
S. and Kumar, R. and Garcia, H. E. (2003)], [Sampath, M. and Lafortune, S. (1998)], [Qiu,
W. and Kumar, R. (2006)], [Zad, S. H. and Kwong, R. H. and Wonham, W. M. (2003)]. The
application of DESs failure diagnosis includes HVAC systems [Sampath, M. and Sengupta,
R. and Lafortune, S. and Sinnamohideen, K. and Teneketzis, D. C. (1996)], transportation
systems [Lygeros, J. and Godbole, D. N. and Broucke, M. (2000)], [Godbole, D. N. and
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Lygeros, J. and Singh, E. and Deshpande, A. and Lindsey, A. E. (2000)], communication
networks [Beneveniste, A. and Fabre, E. and Haar, S. and Jard, C. (2003)], [Bouloutas,
A. and Hart, G. W. and Schwartz, M. (1992)], [Miller, R. E. and Arisha, A. K. (2001)],
manufacturing systems [Das, S. R. and Holloway, L. E. (2000)], [Pandalai, D. and Holloway,
L. (2000)], digital circuits [Lin, F. (1994)], [Westerman, G. and Kumar, R. and Stroud, C.
and Heath, J. R. (1998)], and power system [Hadjicostis, C. N. and Verghese, G. C. (2001)].
1.5 Organization of Dissertation
This dissertation is organized as follows:
In Chapter 2, necessary preliminaries and notations are introduced. We first introduce the
definition of language, and the notations and operations about language. Then we give the
definition of automaton, with a simple example. After that, we introduce the generated and
marked language of an automaton. The definition of supervisor is also introduced. As the
third part of the introduction, we give the definition of stability, including state stability and
language stability.
In Chapter 3, we introduce a framework of fault-tolerant supervisory control of discrete
event systems. We first formulate the definition of fault-tolerant supervisory control, and give a
sufficient and necessary condition for the existence of a fault-tolerant supervisor. The condition
involves the notion of controllability, observability and stability. An example of a simplified
power system is provided. As an extension, we also develop a notion of weakly fault-tolerant
supervisor control, which requires weaker conditions. A sufficient and necessary condition for
the weakly fault-tolerant supervisor, and an example is provided. At the end of this chapter,
we briefly introduce the notion of nonuniformly-bounded fault-tolerance as an extension.
In Chapter 4, we introduce the synthesizing algorithm to obtain a fault-tolerant supervisor.
Since the previous chapter gives the existence condition, it is natural to formulate the algorithm
to find a supervisor when the condition is satisfied. In this chapter, we synthesize an optimal
fault-tolerant supervisor that maximizes the nonfaulty behavior of the controlled system and
at the same time minimizes the faulty behavior. The complexity of this algorithm is quadratic
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in the size of plant. A deliberately designed abstract example and an application example are
provided to illustrate the algorithm.
In Chapter 5, we introduce the notion of safe-codiagnosability, as an extension of the
notion of safe-diagnosability to decentralized setting, where multiple independent diagnosors
can perform diagnosis without communication. Safe-codiagnosability requires that when a
fault occurs, there exist at least one diagnosor that can detect the faulty event before the
safety specification being violated. To verify safe-codiagnosability, we provide an algorithm
with polynomial complexity.
In Chapter 6, we summarize this dissertation and discuss the possible research topics in
the future.
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CHAPTER 2. PRELIMINARIES AND NOTATIONS
In this section, we will introduce some prerequisite definitions, about automata and lan-
guages, and the notations that will be frequently used in the next chapters.
2.1 Languages
In the previous chapter, we introduced that discrete-event systems concern about the order
of the states visited and the events that cause the state transitions. We assume that the
behavior of the DES is described in terms of event sequences of the form e1e2 · · · en, where
ei(i = 1, 2, . . . , n) is the 〉th event occurred. Such event sequence is called a trace or string of
the systems. A collection of traces is called a language.
A string with no events is called an empty string, and is denoted by ². The length of a
string is the number of events contained in it. We use |s| to denote the length of string s.
Then, the length of an empty string is zero.
Language is defined over an event set. For example, given an event set E = {a, b, c}, a
language can be defined as L = {², a, abb, ca}. Let Σ∗ denote the set of all finite length strings
consisting of events from Σ, including empty string. Then, a language is a subset of Σ∗. For
example, if Σ = {a, b, c}, then
Σ∗ = {², a, b, c, aa, ab, ac, ba, bb, bc, ca, cb, ca, aaa, . . .}
Given two languages K1,K2 ⊆ Σ∗, the following binary operations are available([Kumar,
R. and Garg, V. K. (1995)]):
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• The intersection of K1 and K2, denoted as K1 ∩K2, is the language
K1 ∩K2 = {s ∈ Σ∗|s ∈ K1 and s ∈ K2}.
• The difference between K1 and K2, denoted as K1 −K2, is the language
K1 −K2 = {s ∈ Σ∗|s ∈ K1 and s 6∈ K2}.
• The choice between K1 and K2, denoted as K1 +K2, is the language
K1 +K2 = {s ∈ Σ∗|s ∈ K1 or s ∈ K2} = K1 ∪K2.
• The concatenation of K1 and K2, denoted as K1.K2 (or simply K1K2), is the language
K1.K2 = {s.t ∈ Σ∗|s ∈ K1 and t ∈ K2}.
• The quotient of K1 with respect to K2, denoted as K1/K2, is the language
K1/K2 = {s ∈ Σ∗|∃t ∈ K2 such that st ∈ K1}.
• The language K1 after K2, denoted as K1\K2, is the language
K1\K2 = {s ∈ Σ∗|∃t ∈ K2 such that ts ∈ K1}.
If uv = s with u, v ∈ Σ∗, then u is called a prefix of s, and v is called a suffix of s. u and
v are also substrings of s. Note that ² and s are prefixes, suffixes and substrings of s, since
s = ²s = s².
Consider a language K ⊆ Σ∗, the following unary operations are available[Kumar, R. and
Garg, V. K. (1995)]:
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• The complement of K, denoted as Kc ⊆ Σ∗, is the language
Kc = Σ∗ −K.
• The Kleene closure of K, denoted as K∗, is the language
K∗ =
⋃
n∈N
Kn,
where K0 = {²}, and for each n ≥ 0, Kn+1 = Kn.K.
• The prefix closure, denoted as pr(K) ⊆ Σ∗ (sometimes denoted also as K¯), is the language
pr(K) = {s ∈ Σ∗|∃t ∈ K : s ≤ t}.
• The extension closure, denoted as ext(K) ⊆ Σ∗, is the language
ext(K) = {s ∈ Σ∗|∃t ∈ K : t ≤ s}.
• The reverse of K, denoted as KR ⊆ Σ∗, is the language
KR = {sR ∈ Σ∗|s ∈ K},
where sR denotes the string obtained by reversing the string, i.e.,
²R = ²; ∀s ∈ Σ∗, σ ∈ Σ : (sσ)R = σsR.
K is said to be Kleene closed if K∗ = K; K is said to be prefix closed if pr(K) = K; K is
said to be extension closed if ext(K) = K.
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2.2 Automata
Automaton is also called state machine. An automaton is a device that is capable of
representing a language according to well-defined rules [Cassandras, C. G. and Lafortune,
S. (1999)]. The simplest and most understandable way to represent an automation is to use
a directed graph, like Figure 1.1. Figure 1.1 gives an incomplete description of an automaton,
where the set of the circles is the state set of the automaton, X = {1, 2, 3}. The set of the
labels next to the arrows is the event set of the automaton. Let a be ”move up”, and b be
”move down”. Then the event set is Σ = {a, b}. The arrows represent the transition function
of the automaton, which we denote as α : X ×E → X :
α(1, a) = 2 α(2, b) = 1
α(2, a) = 3 α(3, b) = 2
The notation α(1, a) = 2 means that if the automaton is in state 1, the upon the occurrence
of event a, the automaton will make an instantaneous transition to state 2.
There are two critical parts missing to complete the definition of an automaton, the initial
state and the marked state(s). Suppose the building has an entrance at the first floor, and the
office is located at the third floor. So people always starts from the first floor and goes to the
third floor. Then, state 1 is the initial state, where the task of going to the office starts, and
state 3 is the marked state, where the task completes. Note that the marked states may be
multiple. Usually we use an arrow with no starting state to point to the initial state, and we
use double cycles to represent the marked states. Figure 2.1 gives the complete representation
of the automaton of the elevator.
1 2
a a
bb
3
Figure 2.1 The complete automaton representing the elevator
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Formally, an automaton consists of a state set, a finite set of events, a state transition func-
tion which describes the state(s) that are reached when a certain event occurs in a particular
state, an initial state, and a set of marked states [Kumar, R. and Garg, V. K. (1995)]. So an
automaton, denoted as G, is a 5-tuple:
G = (X,Σ, α, x0, Xm),
where X denote the set of states of G, Σ is the (finite) event set of G, α : X × (Σ∪ {²})→ 2X
is the partial state transition function of G (it is a partial function since it is generally defined
on a subset of X × (Σ ∪ {²})), x0 ∈ X is the initial state of G, and Xm ⊆ X denotes the
set of marked or accepting state of G [Kumar, R. and Garg, V. K. (1995)]. Here, a state
transition on ² represents a hidden transition, also called an ²-move. Note that the state
transition function does not uniquely determine the resulting state. In this case, G is called a
non-deterministic automaton. And G is said to be deterministic if there is no ²-move and the
transition function can uniquely determine the resulting state. Non-deterministic automata
can be changed into deterministic automata. When Σ is an infinite set, the automaton is called
an infinite automaton. My research is focused on deterministic finite automata. So, in the
following, if not obviously mentioned, the automata are all finite and deterministic.
The generated language of G = (X,Σ, α, x0, Xm) is
L(G) = {s ∈ Σ∗|α(x0, s) is defined}.
The marked language of G is
Lm(G) = {s ∈ L(G)|α(x0, s) ∈ Xm}.
The language L(G) contains all the traces that start from the initial state. A trace is in
L(G) if and only if it has a corresponding path in the transition graph, starting at x0. The
marked language Lm(G) is a subset of L(G). It contains all the traces that start from the initial
24
state and end in one of the marked state. Since the marked states are the desired destinations,
the marked languages represent the completion of some certain tasks. The marked language
is also called the language recognized by the automaton. And the automaton is therefore a
recognizer of the given language.
1 2
a
b
c
Figure 2.2 A simple example to show L(G) and Lm(G)
Let’s look at a simple example showing in Figure 2.2 above. There are two states, state 1
is the initial state, and state 2 is the marked state. And there are three transitions, a, b, and
c. So, the generated language is
L = {a, ac, acc, accc, . . . , ab, aba, abac, abacc, abaccc, . . . , acb, acba, acbac, acbacc, acbaccc, . . .},
and the marked language is
Lm = {a, ac, acc, accc, . . . , aba, abac, abacc, abaccc, . . . , acba, acbac, acbacc, acbaccc, . . .}.
Given two automata G1 := (X1,Σ, α1, x01 , Xm1) and G2 := (X2,Σ, α2, x02 , Xm2), G1 is said
to be a subautomaton of G2, denoted as G1 v G2, if there exists an injective map h : X1 → X2
such that ∀s ∈ L(G1) : h(α1(x01 , s)) = α2(x02 , s).
For traces s and t, we use s vG t to denote that the sets of traces that occur in the generated
and the marked languages of G after s are contained in those after t, i.e., L(G)\s ⊆ L(G)\t and
Lm(G)\s ⊆ Lm(G)\t. We write s ∼=G t if s vG t and t vG s. s ∼=G t implies the equivalence of
the behaviors following s and t, whereas s vG t implies the behaviors following s are subsumed
by the behaviors following t.
For control purposes, the event set of G is partitioned into the set of controllable events
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Σc ⊆ Σ and the set of uncontrollable events Σu ⊆ Σ. A language K is said to be controllable
(with respect to G and Σu) if pr(K)Σu ∩ L(G) ⊆ pr(K). The events executed by the plant
are filtered by an observation mask M : Σ → ∆ ∪ {²} that maps the set of events to the set
of ”observed events” (∆). A language K is said to be observable (with respect to G and mask
M) if ∀s, t ∈ pr(K), σ ∈ Σ : M(s) = M(t), sσ ∈ pr(K), tσ ∈ L(G)⇒ tσ ∈ pr(K). A language
K is said to be relative-closed with respect to G, if pr(K) ∩ Lm(G) = K ∩ Lm(G).
A supervisor is another automaton S := (Y,Σ, β, y0, Ym). The supervised plant is the
synchronous composition of G and S, denoted G||S := (X × Y,Σ, γ, (x0, y0), Xm × Ym), where
for (x, y) ∈ X × Y and σ ∈ Σ, γ((x, y), σ) is defined if and only if both α(x, σ) and β(y, σ)
are defined and in which case, γ((x, y), σ) = (α(x, σ), β(y, σ)). It can be concluded that the
generated and the marked languages of the supervised plant are L(G||S) = L(G) ∩ L(S) and
Lm(G||S) = Lm(G) ∩ Lm(S), respectively.
A supervisor S is said to be
1. nonmarking if Lm(G||S) = L(G||S) ∩ Lm(G),
2. nonblocking if pr(Lm(G||S)) = L(G||S),
3. Σu-compatible if it does not disable any uncontrollable event (equivalently if L(G||S) is
controllable),
4. M -compatible if the controls following the indistinguishable traces are identical (equiva-
lently if L(G||S) is observable),
5. (Σu,M)-compatible if it is both Σu-compatible and M -compatible (See for example [Ku-
mar, R. and Garg, V. K. (1995)]).
It is known that given a nonempty specification language K ⊆ Lm(G), there exists a
(Σu,M)-compatible, nonmarking and nonblocking supervisor if and only ifK is relative-closed,
controllable and observable [Lin, F. and Wonham, W. M. (1988)].
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2.3 Stability
For discrete event systems, there are two forms of stability: state-stability, as introduced
in [Brave, Y. and Heymann, M. (1990)], [O¨zveren, C. M. and Willsky, A. S. and Antsaklis,
P. J. (1991)], and language-stability, as introduced in [Kumar, R. and Garg, V. K. and
Marcus, S. I. (1993)], [Willner, Y. and Heymann, M. (1995)]. The notion of state-stability
is first introduced below.
Given X̂ ⊆ X, x ∈ X is X̂-attractable in G if there exists a non-negative integer N such
that for all traces t from x that are either deadlocking or have length greater than or equal
to m, t visits X̂. x ∈ X is controllably X̂-attractable in G if there exists a supervisor S such
that x is X̂-attractable in G‖S. We use ΩG(X̂), called the region of attraction of X̂, to denote
the set of all X̂-attractable states, and X̂ is called an attractor for the set ΩG(X̂). We use
ΩcG(X̂), called the region of controllable attraction of X̂, to denote the set of all controllably
X̂-attractable states, and X̂ is called a controllable attractor for the set ΩcG(X̂). A state set
X˜ ⊆ X is said to be attractable to X̂ if X˜ ⊆ ΩG(X̂) and controllably attractable to X̂ if
X˜ ⊆ ΩcG(X̂). Clearly, X̂ ⊆ ΩG(X̂) ⊆ ΩcG(X̂).
A language L ⊆ Σ∗ is said to be language-stable (`-stable) with respect to languageK ⊆ Σ∗,
or converges to K, if there exists m ∈ N such that for all s ∈ L with |s| ≥ m or s deadlocks,
exist s′ ≤ s and v ∈ K with |s′| ≤ m and s = s′v. In this case m is said to be the delay-
bound of convergence. It follows from the definition that L is `-stable with respect to K if for
every trace s ∈ L longer than m or is deadlocking, there exists a prefix of length at most m
after which the corresponding suffix belongs to K. Further, a language L ⊆ Σ∗ is said to be
language-stabilizable (`-stabilizable) with respect to K, if there exists a supervisor S such that
L(G||S) is `-stable with respect to K.
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CHAPTER 3. A FRAMEWORK FOR FAULT-TOLERANT CONTROL
OF DISCRETE EVENT SYSTEMS
In this chapter, we introduce our study on fault-tolerant supervisory control of discrete
event systems. Given a plant, possessing both faulty and nonfaulty behavior, and a submodel
for just the nonfaulty part, the goal of fault-tolerant supervisory control is to enforce a certain
specification for the nonfaulty plant and another (perhaps more liberal) specification for the
overall plant, and further to ensure that the plant recovers from any fault within a bounded
delay so that following the recovery the system state is equivalent to a nonfaulty state (as if
no fault ever happened). The specification for the overall plant is more liberal compared to
the one for the nonfaulty part since a degraded performance may be allowed after a fault has
occurred.
We formulate this notion of fault-tolerant supervisory control and provide a necessary
and sufficient condition for the existence of such a supervisor. The condition involves the
usual notions of controllability, observability and relative-closure, together with the notion of
stability. An example of a power system is provided to illustrate the framework. We also
propose a weaker notion of fault-tolerance where following the recovery, the system state is
simulated by some nonfaulty state, i.e. behaviors following the recovery are also the behaviors
from some faulty state.
Also, we formulate the corresponding notion of weakly fault-tolerant supervisory control
and present a necessary and sufficient condition (involving the notion of language-stability)
for the its existence. We also introduce the notion of nonuniformly-bounded fault-tolerance
(and its weak version) where the delay-bound for recovery is not uniformly bounded over the
set of faulty traces, and show that when the plant model has finitely many states, this more
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general notion of fault-tolerance coincides with the one in which the delay-bound for recovery
is uniformly bounded.
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we introduce a framework for fault-tolerant supervisory control of DESs.
Given a plant G, possessing both faulty and nonfaulty behavior, and a submodel GN for the
nonfaulty part, the goal of fault-tolerant supervisory control is to enforce a certain specification
KN for the nonfaulty plant GN and another (perhaps more liberal) specification K ⊇ KN for
the overall plant G, and further to ensure that the plant recovers from any fault within a
bounded delay, so that following the recovery the system state is equivalent to a nonfaulty
state (as if no fault ever happened). A fault is modeled as an uncontrollable event, occurrence
of which causes a transition from the nonfaulty part to the faulty part. The specifications K
andKN can be used to specify both the safety and the progress requirements. Since a degraded
performance may be tolerable after the occurrence of a fault, the second specification is more
liberal than the first one (and so it allows a larger set of traces).
In [Lafortune, S. and Lin, F. (1991)], authors considered a pair of specifications, rep-
resenting the desired and the (more liberal) tolerable behavior for a plant G and proposed
a general solution of their problem. In our setting, we also have two specifications: One is
a desired behavior for the system without faults, and the other is a desired behavior for the
system with faults. The control goal in our setting includes also the fault-tolerance: Other
than meeting the respective specifications, the controller needs to ensure that a recovery takes
following any fault within a bounded delay.
There has been some prior work on fault-tolerant control of DESs (see for example [Jensen,
R. M. (2003)]). Some prior approaches involved controller switching upon the occurrence of
a fault as in [Darabi, H. and Jafari, M. A. and Buczak, A. L. (2003)], or re-computation
of a controller as in [Rohloff, K. R. (2005)]. The resulting controlled system can tolerate
some faults but the system performance after faults can remain degraded since the notion of
recovery from faults was not incorporated. Case studies involving synthesis of fault-tolerant
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supervisors can also be found in [Cho, K. -H. and Lim, J. -T. (1996)], [Cho, K. -H. and Lim,
J. -T. (1998)], [Zhou, M. C. and Dicesare, F. (1989)]. Design of certain coordination protocols
for automated highway systems to achieve fault-tolerance under vehicle failures is reported in
[Lygeros, J. and Godbole, D. N. and Broucke, M. (2000)], [Godbole, D. N. and Lygeros, J.
and Singh, E. and Deshpande, A. and Lindsey, A. E. (2000)]. Takai et al. considered the
problem of reliable decentralized supervisory control [Takai, S. and Ushio, T. (2000)], where
they studied fault-tolerance with respect to the failures of the supervisors. Fault-tolerance
in Petri Net is considered in [Iordache, M. V. and Antsaklis, P. J. (2004)], where liveness
enforcing strategies are designed to deal with failures using system reconfigurations.
Here we consider the general problem of fault-tolerant supervisory control with fault recov-
ery. A supervisor is used not only to enforce certain control specifications but also to ensure
recovery following any fault. We formulate and study the above fault-tolerant control problem
and provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of such a supervisor. The con-
dition involves the usual notions of controllability, observability and relative-closure, together
with the notion of stability. The state-stability property is used to establish bounded delay
recovery from a fault [Brave, Y. and Heymann, M. (1990)], [O¨zveren, C. M. and Willsky,
A. S. and Antsaklis, P. J. (1991).
As mentioned above, by recovery we imply returning, within bounded delay, to a state that
is equivalent to a nonfaulty state. In some applications, a weaker form of recovery may suffice
where the behaviors following the recovery are also the behaviors from some nonfaulty state.
Thus following the recovery, the system satisfies those properties that are also satisfied by the
behaviors starting from some nonfaulty state. We study this weaker notion of fault-tolerant
control, and give a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a weakly fault-tolerant
supervisor. In contrast to the state-stability, the property of language-stability [Kumar, R.
and Garg, V. K. and Marcus, S. I. (1993)], [Willner, Y. and Heymann, M. (1995)] is required.
We also introduce the notion of nonuniformly-bounded fault-tolerance (and its weak ver-
sion) where the delay-bound for recovery is not uniformly bounded over the set of faulty
traces, and show that when the plant model has finitely many states, this more general notion
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of fault-tolerance coincides with the one in which the delay-bound for recovery is uniformly
bounded.
The objective of our work is the synthesis of a fault-tolerant controller for a given plant,
whereas the work in the computer science community (such as [Arora, A. and Gouda,
M. (1993)], [Arora, A. and Kulkarni, S. S. (1998)], [Attie, P. C. and Arora, A. and Emerson,
E. A. (2004)]) considers the design of a system (a ”plant”) that is fault-tolerant. In [Arora, A.
and Kulkarni, S. S. (1998)], [Attie, P. C. and Arora, A. and Emerson, E. A. (2004)], a system
is said to be nonmasking fault-tolerant if after the occurrence of a fault the system specification
is eventually satisfied. This is analogous to the notion of fault-tolerance we consider. [Arora,
A. and Kulkarni, S. S. (1998)], [Attie, P. C. and Arora, A. and Emerson, E. A. (2004)]
also considers the stronger notion of masking fault-tolerance which requires that the system
specifications remain satisfied even after the occurrence of a fault. This stronger property can
also be captured in our setting by requiring that the two specifications K and KN represent
the same property.
3.2 Fault-Tolerant Supervisory Control
In this section, we introduce a notion of fault-tolerant supervisory control. Consider
a plant with model G = (X,Σ, α, x0, Xm) which represents the behavior prior to as well as
subsequent to faults, i.e., the overall behavior. Let the nonfaulty part of the plant G be
modeled as GN = (XN ,Σ, αN , x0, XNm ). Without loss of generality, G
N v G, i.e., GN is a
subautomaton of G. The pair (G,GN ) is said to be fault-tolerant if every post-fault behavior
becomes equivalent to a nonfaulty behavior in a uniformly bounded delay. This property is
captured as follows:
Definition 1 Given a plant G with its nonfaulty part GN , (G,GN ) is said to be fault-tolerant
if exists m ∈ N such that for s ∈ L(G) − L(GN ), st ∈ L(G) with |t| ≥ m or st deadlocks,
there exist u ∈ L(GN ) and t′ ≤ t with |t′| ≤ m and st′ ∼=G u. In this case, m is called the
delay-bound of fault-tolerance.
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Figure 3.1 Automaton G and its corresponding Gmin
The plant represented as the pair (G,GN ) is fault-tolerant if within a uniformly bounded
delay of the occurrence of a fault, the plant state returns to a state equivalent to a nonfaulty
state. Then the ensuing behavior is such that no fault ever happened. Therefore, after recovery,
the system assumes full functionality. When the system model is minimal, i.e., possessing a
minimal number of states, this means that following recovery, the system reaches a nonfaulty
state. This, however, may not hold in general as shown in Figure 3.1, where Gmin represents
a minimal model of G. (The dashed edges represent uncontrollable transitions.) Following a
fault, Gmin recovers to a nonfaulty state in one transition and so clearly it is fault-tolerant.
This is not the case for the model G but, being behaviorally equivalent to Gmin, G is also
fault-tolerant. (In Figure 3.1, state x¯ is equivalent to nonfaulty state x.) Our definition is
behavior-based and captures this situation.
The following example illustrates a fault-tolerant plant model.
Example 1 Consider the plant G and its nonfaulty part GN shown in Figure 3.2 that models a
machine. Initially the machine is idle and nonfaulty. The start event a transitions the machine
to working and nonfaulty state, and the stop event b brings it back to the initial state. In
the working and nonfaulty state, an occurrence of the fault event f causes the machine to
transition to the working and faulty state. An execution of b at this state causes the machine
to move to the idle and faulty state from where the repair event c brings the machine back
to the initial state. An execution of the repair event in the idle and nonfaulty state does not
change the machine state. It can be verified that G is minimal.
When there is an exit from the nonfaulty part due to the execution of f , a return within
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a bounded delay is not guaranteed since there exists a cycle between the two faulty states. It
follows that (G,GN ) is not fault-tolerant.
Figure 3.2 Plant G and its nonfaulty part GN
The above notion of fault-tolerance is a type of state-stability property. This is established
in the following theorem.
Theorem 1 Consider a plant G = (X,Σ, δ, x0, Xm) and its nonfaulty part
GN = (XN ,Σ, δN , x0, XNm ), and suppose the corresponding minimal plant and its nonfaulty
part are Gmin = (Xmin,Σ, δmin, x0,min, Xm,min) and GNmin = (X
N
min,Σ, δ
N
min, x0,min, X
N
m,min)
respectively. (G,GN ) is fault-tolerant if and only if Xmin is attractable to XNmin, i.e., Xmin ⊆
ΩGmin(X
N
min).
Proof: Since Gmin and GNmin are minimal models of G and G
N , L(Gmin) = L(G),
L(GNmin) = L(G
N ), and since for any s, t ∈ L(G) = L(Gmin), [s ∼=G t] ⇔ [s ∼=Gmin t].
Therefore, (G,GN ) is fault-tolerant if and only (Gmin, GNmin) is fault-tolerant.
Also note that Xmin ⊆ ΩGmin(XNmin) is equivalent to Xmin −XNmin ⊆ ΩGmin(XNmin).
(⇒) Pick s ∈ L(Gmin)− L(GNmin). Since s ∈ L(Gmin)− L(GNmin), exists x ∈ Xmin −XNmin
such that δmin(x0, s) = x. Since x ∈ Xmin−XNmin ⊆ ΩGmin(XNmin), exists m > 0 such that, for
all t, for which δmin(x, t) is defined and either |t| ≥ m or δmin(x, t) is deadlocking, exists t′ ≤ t
such that δmin(x, t′) ∈ XNmin. It shows that m is the desired delay bound for fault-tolerance.
To see this, pick t such that st ∈ L(Gmin) and either |t| ≥ m or st is deadlocking. Then
δmin(x, t′) ∈ XNmin for some t′ ≤ t. Let u ∈ L(GNmin) be such that δmin(x0, u) = δmin(x, t′).
Then u and st′ reach the same state in Gmin, so u ∼=Gmin st′.
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(⇐) Now assuming (Gmin, GNmin) to be fault-tolerant, we establish that Xmin − XNmin ⊆
ΩGmin(X
N
min). Pick x ∈ Xmin − XNmin. Then there exists s ∈ L(Gmin) − L(GNmin) such that
δmin(x0, s) = x. From the fault-tolerance of (Gmin, GNmin), there exists m > 0 such that, for
all t with st ∈ L(Gmin) and either |t| ≥ m or st is deadlocking, exists u ∈ L(GNmin) and t′ ≤ t
satisfying u ∼=Gmin st′. From the minimality of Gmin, equivalence of u and st′ implies they
reach the same state. Since u ∈ L(GNmin), δmin(x0, st′) = δmin(x0, u) ∈ XNmin. It follows that,
for each t such that δmin(x, t) is defined, and |t| ≥ m or δmin(x, t) is deadlocking, exist t′ ≤ t
such that δmin(x, t′) ∈ XNmin. This implies Xmin −XNmin ⊆ ΩGmin(XNmin).
A given plant (G,GN ) may not be intrinsically fault-tolerant but could be made so through
the use of control. This motivates us to formulate the notion of a fault-tolerant supervisor,
which exercises appropriate control actions so that the controlled plant (G||S,GN ||S) is fault-
tolerant. The control actions of a fault-tolerant supervisor ensure that following any fault, a
recovery takes place within a bounded number of steps, i.e., the controlled plant state returns
to a state from where the future behaviors are such that as if no fault ever happened.
Definition 2 Given a plant G with its nonfaulty part GN , a supervisor S is said to be fault-
tolerant if (G||S,GN ||S) is fault-tolerant.
The following example illustrates the notion of fault-tolerance of a supervisor.
Example 2 Consider the example of Figure 3.2. The start event a is controllable and disabled
by a supervisor S at the idle and faulty state. The controlled systems (G‖S,GN‖S) is shown
in Figure 3.3. It can be the seen that from any faulty state a return to some nonfaulty state is
guaranteed within at most two transitions, i.e., (G‖S,GN‖S) is fault-tolerant, or equivalently,
S is a fault-tolerant supervisor for (G,GN ).
The following corollary follows from Theorem 9.
Corollary 1 Given a plant G and its nonfaulty part GN , and their corresponding minimal
plant Gmin and GNmin, exists a fault-tolerant supervisor S if and only if Xmin ⊆ ΩcGmin(XNmin).
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Figure 3.3 Controlled plant (G‖S,GN‖S)
Proof: Xmin ⊆ ΩcGmin(XNmin) if and only if exists supervisor S such that
Xmin ⊆ ΩGmin‖S(XNmin), or equivalently exists supervisor S such that (Gmin‖S,GNmin‖S) is
fault-tolerant. (The last equivalence follows from Theorem 9.)
3.3 Existence of Fault-Tolerant Supervisor
The previous section formulated the notion of a fault-tolerant supervisor as one that
ensures recovery from a fault within a bounded number of steps. In general, a supervisor
needs to enforce certain other control specifications. For example in Figure 3.3, the plant
possesses certain illegal and certain final states. The supervisor must also ensure that the
illegal states are never visited while the final states are always reachable. To capture such
control requirements, we use a pair of specification languages KN ⊆ Lm(GN ) and K ⊆ Lm(G)
satisfying KN ⊆ K. Here KN represents the control specification for the nonfaulty plant, and
a different control specification, namely K, is used for the overall plant. This specification is
taken to be “more liberal” (K ⊇ KN ) since a downgraded performance may be tolerable after
a fault has occurred.
Thus a fault-tolerant supervisory control problem is formulated as follows: Given a plant
G, its nonfaulty part GN , specifications K and KN (with KN ⊆ K), find a nonmarking,
nonblocking, (Σu,M)-compatible and fault-tolerant supervisor S such that Lm(GN ||S) = KN
and Lm(G||S) = K.
A necessary and sufficient condition for this is provided in the following theorem.
Theorem 2 Given a plant G = (X,Σ, α, x0, Xm) with nonfaulty part
GN = (XN ,Σ, αN , x0, XNm ), specification ∅ 6= K ⊆ Lm(G) for G and specification ∅ 6= KN ⊆
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Lm(GN ) for GN satisfying KN ⊆ K, there exists a nonmarking, nonblocking (with respect to
both GN and G), (Σu,M)-compatible and fault-tolerant supervisor S such that
1. Lm(GN ||S) = KN , L(GN ||S) = pr(Lm(GN ||S)), and
2. Lm(G||S) = K and L(G||S) = pr(Lm(G||S))
if and only if
1. K is relative-closed, controllable and observable with respect to G,
2. In a minimal R = (Q,Σ, α, q0, Qm) and RN = (QN ,Σ, αN , q0, QNm) with R
N v R,
Lm(RN ) = KN , and Lm(R) = K, it holds that Q ⊆ ΩR(QN ),
3. KN = K ∩ Lm(GN ), and pr(KN ) = pr(K) ∩ L(GN ).
Proof: From [Kumar, R. and Garg, V. K. (1995)], we know there exists a (Σu,M)-
compatible, nonmarking and nonblocking supervisor S such that Lm(G||S) = K and L(G||S) =
pr(K) if and only if K is relative-closed, controllable and observable with respect to G. R and
RN accept the same languages as G||S and GN ||S, and they are minimal. From Theorem 9, we
know (G‖S,GN‖S) is fault-tolerant if and only if in a minimal model ((G‖S)min, (GN‖S)min) =
(R,RN ) it holds that Q ⊆ ΩR(QN ).
So we only need to show that given Lm(G‖S) = K and L(G‖S) = pr(K), we have
Lm(GN‖S) = KN and L(GN‖S) = pr(KN ) if and only if K and KN are constrained by
KN = K ∩Lm(GN ) and pr(KN ) = pr(K)∩L(GN ). This follows from the following two series
of equalities.
KN = Lm(GN ||S)
= Lm(GN ) ∩ Lm(S)
= Lm(GN ) ∩ Lm(S) ∩ Lm(G)
= Lm(GN ) ∩ Lm(G||S)
= Lm(GN ) ∩K, and
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pr(KN ) = L(GN ||S)
= L(GN ) ∩ L(S)
= L(GN ) ∩ L(S) ∩ L(G)
= L(GN ) ∩ L(G||S)
= L(GN ) ∩ pr(K).
Remark 1 In Condition 1 of Theorem 2, the relative-closure property can be checked in
O(|G||R|) [Kumar, R. and Garg, V. K. (1995)], the controllability property can be checked
in O(|G||R|), and observability property can be checked in O(|G||R|2). Condition 2 can be
checked in O(|Q|) [Brave, Y. and Heymann, M. (1990)]. Both parts of Condition 3 can be
checked in O(|G||R|). (The two parts of condition can be checked by checking in G‖R whether
XNm ×Qm ⊆ XNm ×QNm and XN ×R ⊆ XN × RN , respectively.) Thus the overall complexity
of verifying the condition of Theorem 2 is O(|G||R|2).
In Theorem 2 it is required that the supervisor be nonblocking with respect to both the
nonfaulty plant and the overall plant. It turns out that due to the additional requirement of
fault-tolerance, the requirement of nonblockingness with respect to the overall plant may be
dropped, without altering the nature of the control problem. In other words, the following
result holds.
Theorem 3 Given a plant G = (X,Σ, α, x0, Xm) with nonfaulty part
GN = (XN ,Σ, αN , x0, XNm ), there exists a nonblocking and fault-tolerant supervisor S such
that L(GN ||S) = pr(Lm(GN ||S)) and L(G||S) = pr(Lm(G||S)) if and only if there exists a
nonblocking and fault-tolerant supervisor S such that L(GN ||S) = pr(Lm(GN ||S)).
Proof: Clearly, the necessity (⇒) holds. We only need to prove the sufficiency (⇐) by
showing L(G||S) ⊆ pr(Lm(G||S)).
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To see this, pick any s ∈ L(G||S). Then either s ∈ L(GN ||S) in which case
s ∈ pr(Lm(GN ||S)) ⊆ pr(Lm(G||S)), or s ∈ L(G||S) − L(GN ||S). In the latter case, s is a
faulty trace and let m be the delay-bound of fault-tolerance. Consider an extension t of s such
that st ∈ L(G||S), and |t| ≥ m or st deadlocks. In either case, there exists u ∈ L(GN ||S) =
pr(Lm(GN ||S)) and t = t′v such that |t′| ≤ m and uv ∈ L(G||S). Since u ∈ pr(Lm(GN ||S)),
there exists v ∈ Lm(GN ||S)\{u} ⊆ Lm(G||S)\{u} = Lm(G||S)\{st′}. So it follows that
st′ ∈ pr(Lm(G||S)), which implies s ∈ pr(Lm(G||S)).
In Theorem 2, we allowed (K,KN ) to be an arbitrary pair of languages, and together they
can capture both safety and liveness requirements. In some applications, the specification for
the overall plant can simply be a safety specification, i.e., K = pr(K). Theorem 2 can be
specialized to address this situation resulting in the following corollary:
Corollary 2 Given a plant G = (X,Σ, α, x0, Xm) with nonfaulty part
GN = (XN ,Σ, αN , x0, XNm ), specification ∅ 6= K ⊆ Lm(G) for G and specification ∅ 6=
KN ⊆ Lm(GN ) for GN satisfying KN ⊆ K, there exists a nonmarking, nonblocking, (Σu,M)-
compatible and fault-tolerant supervisor S such that
1. Lm(GN ||S) = KN , L(GN ||S) = pr(Lm(GN ||S)), and
2. L(G||S) = K.
if and only if
1. K is prefix-closed, controllable and observable with respect to G,
2. In a minimalR = (Q,Σ, α, q0, Qm) andR = (QN ,Σ, αN , q0, QNm) withR
N v R, Lm(RN ) =
KN and L(R) = K, it holds that Q−QN ⊆ ΩR(QN ),
3. KN = K ∩ Lm(GN ), and
4. pr(KN ) = K ∩ L(GN ).
The proof of Corollary 2 is similar to that of Theorem 2 and is omitted for brevity.
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3.4 Application Example
We provide an application to illustrate our fault-tolerant control framework developed
above by examining an abstracted model of a power system [Anderson, P. M. and Fouad,
A. A. (1994)] shown in Figure 3.4. In this system, there are three generators (G1, G2 and G3)
and three loads (Load A, B and C), connected by nine buses (1 - 9).
Figure 3.4 A 9-bus power system
The states of a power system are typically categorized into six different classes depending
on the stability, safety, performance, and security margin properties they possess (as shown
in the table below). Stability of the system refers to the stability of the individual generators.
Safety refers to the line powers and bus voltages being within an acceptable threshold. The
system is said to have normal performance when all load demands are met, and otherwise the
performance is said to be Degraded (as some loads may be shed and some generators may be
switched-off). Security Margin refers to the margin by which system load may be increased
without violating stability or safety.
A normal state is one where system behavior is acceptable with respect to all four properties,
and security margin is large enough that the occurrence of a single fault keeps the system
behavior acceptable. An alert state is one where the system behavior is acceptable but security
margin is small so that the occurrence of a single fault causes the system behavior to become
unacceptable (i.e., one of the four properties may be violated). An emergency state is one where
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Table 3.1 State categories
Category Stable Safe Performance Margin
Normal (N) yes yes normal large
Alert (A) yes yes normal small
Emergency (E) yes no - -
In-extremis (I) no - - -
Recovery (R) yes yes Degraded -
Failed (F) - - None -
stability is not violated but safety is violated, whereas an in-extremis is state is one where the
stability is violated. A recovery state is one where safety and stability are not violated but
the system performance is downgraded. Finally a failed state is one where the system is out-of
service.
Some features of the power system shown in Figure 3.4 are listed below:
1. The feasible uncontrollable events are the two line-faults:
Table 3.2 List of faults in power system example
f1 Power line between buses 5 & 7 faulted
f2 Power line between buses 5 & 4 faulted
2. The feasible controllable events are:
Table 3.3 List of controllable events in power system example
c Switch-on capacitor at bus 5
c Switch-off capacitor at bus 5
p0 Switch-on power control at generators/loads prior to the critical time
p1 Switch-on power control at generators/loads after the critical time
p Switch-off power control at generators/loads
r Repair a faulted line (when system is stable)
3. States are abstracted to represent the values of the 4 binary state-variables: {s1s2s3s4},
the meaning of which is listed as follows:
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Table 3.4 Meaning of state variables in power system example
Variable Meaning 1 0
s1 Line 5-9 disconnected? yes no
s2 Line 5-4 disconnected? yes no
s3 capacitor control on? yes no
s4 power control on? yes no
There is an additional special state, namely the “Failed” state denoted as “F”, in which
the system is out-of-service.
4. No control is exercised that takes the system to a “worse” state (for example, the control
action of “switching off the capacitor” is not allowed in the alert state 1010 as this will
cause a transition to the emergency state 1000).
5. We assume that no fault occurs in a recovery state.
The abstracted model of the power system is shown in Figure 3.5. In Figure 3.5,
Figure 3.5 Model of power system of Figure 3.4
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there are 16 “non-failed” states, and depending on their stability, safety, performance, and
security margin properties are classified into one of five categories: normal (0010), alert (0000,
1010, 0110), recovery (---1), emergency (1000, 0100), and in-extremis (11-0). (Note that “-”
represents a 0 or a 1.) In Figure 3.5 all solid edges are controllable and all dashed edges
are uncontrollable. The only uncontrollable events are the two line-fault events. All events
including the line-fault events are observable. (When a line-fault occurs, the circuit breakers
at the ends of the line open-up to disconnect that line and that information can be used to
determine the occurrence of a line-fault.)
The normal operation corresponds to no faults (s1 = s2 = 0), capacitive control on (s3 = 1),
and power control off (s4 = 0). In this state the system behaves acceptable and has large
security margin. Switching the capacitive control off or the occurrence of a single fault causes
the security margin to become smaller and the system transitions to one of the alert states
0000 (when capacitive control is switched off), or 1010 (when fault f1 occurs), or 0110 (when
fault f2 occurs). In state 0000 no fault has occurred but the capacitive control is off. Due
to this, the occurrence of either fault f1 or f2 causes the system to violate safety (voltage at
bus 5 dipping below a threshold) and transitions the system to an emergency state (1000 or
0100). On the other hand, in the normal state (0010), the occurrence of a single fault results
in state (1010) or (0110), both of which offer acceptable behavior (no voltage dipping takes
place due to the capacitive control being on). However, the occurrence of a second fault in
one of these two alert states causes the system to transition to an in-extremis state (1110),
where the system loses stability. Similarly, the occurrence of a second fault from one of the
emergency states (1000 or 0100) causes the system to also lose stability, transiting it to an
in-extremis state (1100). In an in-extremis state, system has lost stability and if the power
control (generation/load shut-down) is not exercised in a timely fashion (before the “critical
fault clearance” time), the system reaches the Failed state. Otherwise (if the power control
is exercised in a timely fashion), the system acquires stability and safety but its performance
is degraded (some generators/loads are tripped/shed). Thus a recovery state corresponds to
a state where power control is on, i.e., s4 = 1. A combination of repair of faulted lines and
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re-energization of generators/loads causes the power system to recover to its normal operating
mode.
Figure 3.6 Nonfaulty part GN of power system
In Figure 3.5, the overall plant model G has 17 states, and the nonfaulty part GN consists
of the states where no fault has occurred, i.e., the states with label (00–), which includes the
normal state (0010), one of the alert states (0000), and two recovery states (0001, and 0011).
The model for GN is shown separately in Figure 3.6. The specification K for the overall plant
excludes all traces that reach the Failed state, i.e., the Failed state is deemed forbidden for the
overall plant. Among the four states of GN , the normal state (0010) is deemed a final state,
i.e., KN excludes all traces of GN that end at a non-final state. Clearly, KN ⊆ K.
A fault-tolerant supervisor can be shown to exist and the controlled system under such a
supervisor is shown in Figure 3.7. Each state is labeled with the maximal number of steps it
takes to reach a state of GN . As one can see, the system recovers in no more than 4 transitions,
i.e, the delay-bound of recovery is 4 steps.
3.5 Weakly Fault-Tolerant Supervisory Control
In certain applications, a weaker form of recovery may suffice, namely, the recovery
should cause the system to reach a state which is “simulated” by a nonfaulty state. That is,
behaviors starting from a state after recovery be subsumed by those starting from a nonfaulty
state. Then any safety and liveness property that the system satisfies starting from such a
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Figure 3.7 Supervised power system
nonfaulty state is also satisfied by the system starting from the state after recovery. This
motivates us to introduce a weaker form of fault-tolerance. It turns out that this weaker
form of fault-tolerance can be expressed as a second type of stability property, namely the
language-stability property. The notion of weak fault-tolerance is captured as follows:
Definition 3 Given a plant G with its nonfaulty part GN , (G,GN ) is said to be weakly fault-
tolerant if exists m ∈ N such that for s ∈ L(G) − L(GN ), st ∈ L(G) with |t| ≥ m or st
deadlocks, exists u ∈ L(GN ) and t′ ≤ t with |t′| ≤ m and st′ vG u. In this case, m is called
the delay-bound of weakly fault-tolerance.
The following example illustrates a system that is weakly fault-tolerant but not fault-
tolerant.
Example 3 Let us reconsider (G,GN ) shown in Figure 3.2, which as we discussed above is not
fault-tolerant (due to the presence of the cycle in the faulty part). However after the transition
on f , the state 3 is reached, from where all executable traces are also executable starting from
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the nonfaulty state 2, i.e., the faulty state 3 is simulated by the nonfaulty state 2. To see
this consider the behaviors following a faulty trace saf , where s ∈ (c∗ + (ab)∗)∗. Then we
claim that those behaviors are also possible following the nonfaulty trace sa, i.e., saf vG sa.
The reason being that following the execution of saf , the system ultimately executes a trace
in (ba)∗bc which brings the system to state 2, whereas the execution of any trace in (ba)∗bc
following the trace sa also brings the system to state 2.
The above notion of weak fault-tolerance can be regarded as a type of language conver-
gence property, as demonstrated by the next theorem. The basic idea is that the post-fault
behavior, in a finite number of steps, matches a behavior that is a possible prior to the oc-
currence of a fault. In other words, the behaviors executable after a post-fault behavior are
also executable after the nonfaulty behaviors. Since the matching of behavior following a
finite execution is precisely the notion of language convergence, the weak fault-tolerance prop-
erty can be described as a language convergence property. The faulty behavior is given by,
L(G)− L(GN ). The post-fault behavior has thus the following two parts, the generated part,
L(G)\[L(G)− L(GN )], and the marked part, Lm(G)\[L(G)− L(GN )]. Similarly the behavior
after no fault has occurred also has two parts, namely L(G)\L(GN ) and Lm(G)\L(GN ). For
the plant to be weakly fault-tolerant, traces in generated (resp., marked) post-fault behavior
should converge to traces in generated (resp., marked) behavior prior to the occurrence of a
fault. This is captured in the following theorem.
Theorem 4 Given a plant G and its nonfaulty part GN , (G,GN ) is weakly fault-tolerant
if and only if L(G)\[L(G) − L(GN )] converges to L(G)\L(GN ) and Lm(G)\[L(G) − L(GN )]
converges to Lm(G)\L(GN ).
Proof: First we show that if (G,GN ) is weakly fault-tolerant, then there exists m ∈ N
such that for each t ∈ L(G)\[L(G) − L(GN )] with either |t| ≥ m or t deadlocks, there exists
t′ ≤ t and v ∈ L(G)\L(GN ) such that t = t′v and |t′| ≤ m. We claim that m can be chosen to
be the delay-bound of weak fault-tolerance.
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Since t ∈ L(G)\[L(G) − L(GN )], there exists s ∈ L(G) − L(GN ) such that st ∈ L(G).
Further since |t| ≥ m or t deadlocks, from fault-tolerance of (G,GN ), there exists u ∈
L(GN ) and t = t′v: (|t′| ≤ m and st′ vG u). Since st′v ∈ L(G) and u ∈ L(GN ), it follows that
uv ∈ L(G), therefore v ∈ L(G)\L(GN ), as desired.
Similarly, it can be shown that if (G,GN ) is weakly fault-tolerant with delay-bound of
fault-tolerance m, then t ∈ Lm(G)\[L(G) − L(GN )] with |t| ≥ m or t deadlocks, implies
t = t′v with |t′| ≤ m and v ∈ Lm(G)\L(GN ). As above there exists s ∈ L(G) − L(GN )
such that st ∈ Lm(G). Invoking the fault-tolerance property and noting that st ∈ Lm(G), we
can conclude that t = t′v such that |t′| ≤ m and uv ∈ Lm(G) for some u ∈ L(GN ). Since
u ∈ L(GN ) and uv ∈ Lm(G), it follows that v ∈ Lm(G)\L(GN ), as desired.
In order to prove the sufficiency, we show that the delay-bound m of fault-tolerance can
be chosen to be the same as the delay-bound of convergence of L(G)\[L(G) − L(GN )] to
L(G)\L(GN ) and of Lm(G)\[L(G)− L(GN )] to Lm(G)\L(GN ).
For s ∈ L(G) − L(GN ) pick an extension t such that st ∈ L(G) and either |t| ≥ m or st
deadlocks. Then t ∈ L(G)\[L(G)−L(GN )] and from the convergence of L(G)\[L(G)−L(GN )]
to L(G)\L(GN ), we have t = t′v with |t′| ≤ m and v ∈ L(G)\L(GN ). The latter further
implies the existence of u ∈ L(GN ) such that uv ∈ L(G). Therefore, L(G)\st′ ⊆ L(G)\u, as
desired.
It remains to show that if st ∈ Lm(G), then uv ∈ Lm(G). This requires the second
convergence property. First note that st ∈ Lm(G) and s ∈ L(G) − L(GN ) implies t ∈
Lm(G)\[L(G)−L(GN )]. So from convergence of Lm(G)\[L(G)−L(GN )] to Lm(G)\L(GN ), it
follows that t = t′v with |t′| ≤ m and v ∈ Lm(G)\L(GN ). v ∈ Lm(G)\L(GN ) further implies
the existence of u ∈ L(GN ) such that uv ∈ Lm(G). Therefore, Lm(G)\st′ ⊆ Lm(G)\u, as
desired.
A given plant (G,GN ) may not be intrinsically weakly fault-tolerant but could be made
so through the use of control. This motivates us to formulate the notion of a weakly fault-
tolerant supervisor, which exercises appropriate control actions so that the controlled plant
(G||S,GN ||S) is weakly fault-tolerant. The control actions of a weakly fault-tolerant supervisor
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ensure that following any fault, a recovery takes place within a bounded number of states, i.e.,
the controlled plant reaches a state, starting from where the executable behaviors are also
executable starting from a nonfaulty state.
Definition 4 Given a plant G with its nonfaulty part GN , a supervisor S is said to be weakly
fault-tolerant if (G||S,GN ||S) is weakly fault-tolerant.
The following corollary follows from Theorem 4.
Corollary 3 Given a plant G and its nonfaulty part GN , a supervisor S is weakly fault-
tolerant if and only if L(G||S)\[L(G||S) − L(GN ||S)] converges to L(G||S)\L(GN ||S) and
Lm(G||S)\[L(G||S)− L(GN ||S)] converges to Lm(G||S)\L(GN ||S).
3.6 Existence of Weakly Fault-Tolerant Supervisor
Using the results of the previous section, we next present a condition for the existence of
weakly fault-tolerant supervisor. As before, the supervisor is required to impose a specification
KN on the nonfaulty plant GN and a possibly more liberal specificationK ⊇ KN on the overall
plant. We have the following existence result.
Theorem 5 Given a plant G = (X,Σ, α, x0, Xm) with nonfaulty part
GN = (XN ,Σ, αN , x0, XNm ), specification ∅ 6= K ⊆ Lm(G) for G and specification ∅ 6= KN ⊆
Lm(GN ) for GN satisfying KN ⊆ K, there exists a nonmarking, nonblocking (with respect to
both GN and G), (Σu,M)-compatible and weakly fault-tolerant supervisor S such that
1. Lm(GN ||S) = KN , L(GN ||S) = pr(Lm(GN ||S)), and
2. Lm(G||S) = K and L(G||S) = pr(Lm(G||S))
if and only if
1. K is relative-closed, controllable and observable with respect to G,
2. pr(K)\[pr(K) − pr(KN )] converges to pr(K)\pr(KN ), and K\[pr(K) − pr(KN )] con-
verges to K\pr(KN ),
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3. KN = K ∩ Lm(GN ), and pr(KN ) = pr(K) ∩ L(GN ).
Proof: From [Kumar, R. and Garg, V. K. (1995)], we know there exists a (Σu,M)-
compatible, nonmarking and nonblocking supervisor S such that Lm(G||S) = K and L(G||S) =
pr(K) if and only if K is relative-closed, controllable and observable with respect to G. Also
from Theorem 9, we know S is weakly fault-tolerant such that Lm(GN ||S) = KN , L(GN ||S) =
pr(KN ), Lm(G||S) = K and L(G||S) = pr(K) if and only if pr(K)\[pr(K)−pr(KN )] converges
to pr(K)\pr(KN ) and K\[pr(K)− pr(KN )] converges to K\pr(KN ).
So we only need to show given Lm(G||S) = K and L(G||S) = pr(K), we have Lm(GN ||S) =
KN and L(GN ||S) = pr(KN ) if and only if K and KN are constrained by KN = K ∩Lm(GN )
and pr(KN ) = pr(K) ∩ L(GN ). This is something we proved as part of the proof of Theorem
2.
Remark 2 The complexity of checking conditions 1 and 3 of Theorem 5 are discussed in
Remark 1. Here we only discuss the complexity of checking the second condition. The lan-
guages appearing in the second condition can be recognized using automata of size O(|Q|).
This is because the automaton (Q,Σ, δ,Q − QN , Qm) (i.e., R with its initial state replaced
by the set Q − QN ) generates the language pr(K)\[pr(K) − pr(KN )] and marks the lan-
guage K\[pr(K)− pr(KN )], whereas the automaton (Q,Σ, δ,QN , Qm) (i.e., R with its initial
state replaced by the set QN ) generates the language pr(K)\pr(KN ) and marks the language
K\pr(KN ).
Note that the automata (Q,Σ, δ,Q−QN , Qm) and (Q,Σ, δ,QN , Qm) are nondeterministic
due to the non-uniqueness of the initial state. In order to verify the language convergence
properties of Condition 2, the algorithm given in [Willner, Y. and Heymann, M. (1995)]
can be adapted to the nondeterministic setting to verify whether the language K\[pr(K) −
pr(KN )] marked by (Q,Σ, δ,Q − QN , Qm) converges to the language K\pr(KN ) marked by
(Q,Σ, δ,QN , Qm) as follows: We construct the automaton T := (Z,Σ, γ, Z0, Zm), where
Z = Q× 2Q,
Z0 = {(q,QN )|q ∈ Q−QN},
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Zm = {(q, Q̂)|q ∈ Qm, Q̂ ∩Qm 6= ∅}, and
∀q ∈ Q, Q̂ ⊆ Q, σ ∈ Σ : γ((q, Q̂), σ) := (δ(q, σ), δ(Q̂, σ) ∪QN ).
Let Ẑ := {(q, Q̂) | Lm(R, q) ⊆ Lm(R, Q̂)}, where Lm(R, q) is the language marked byR starting
from the state q, and Lm(R, Q̂) := ∪q̂∈Q̂Lm(R, q̂). Note Lm(T ) = Lm((Q,Σ, δ,Q−QN , Qm)) =
K\[pr(K)−pr(KN )], and a trace t ∈ Lm(T ) ends at a state (q, Q̂) ∈ Ẑ if and only if t possesses
a suffix v ∈ Lm((Q,Σ, δ,QN , Qm)) = K\pr(KN ). Then following the results in [Willner, Y.
and Heymann, M. (1995)] it can be shown that K\[pr(K)−pr(KN )] converges to K\pr(KN )
if and only if Z ⊆ Ω(Ẑ). Next by simply replacing Qm with Q in the convergence test just
described, we can obtain a test for verifying whether pr(K)\[pr(K) − pr(KN )] converges to
pr(K)\pr(KN ). The complexity of checking the language convergence properties of Condition
2 can accordingly concluded to be O(|Q|2(2|Q|)2).
In Theorem 5 it is required that the supervisor be nonblocking with respect to both the
nonfaulty plant and the overall plant. It turns out that due to the additional requirement of
fault-tolerance, the requirement of nonblockingness with respect to the overall plant may be
dropped, without altering the nature of the control problem. In other words, the following
result holds.
Theorem 6 Given a plant G = (X,Σ, α, x0, Xm) with nonfaulty part
GN = (XN ,Σ, αN , x0, XNm ), there exists a nonblocking and fault-tolerant supervisor S such
that L(GN ||S) = pr(Lm(GN ||S)) and L(G||S) = pr(Lm(G||S)) if and only if there exists a
nonblocking and fault-tolerant supervisor S such that L(GN ||S) = pr(Lm(GN ||S)).
Proof: Clearly, the necessity (⇒) holds. We only need to prove the sufficiency (⇐) by
showing L(G||S) ⊆ pr(Lm(G||S)).
To see this, pick any s ∈ L(G||S). Then either s ∈ L(GN ||S) in which case
s ∈ pr(Lm(GN ||S)) ⊆ pr(Lm(G||S)), or s ∈ L(G||S) − L(GN ||S). In the latter case, s is a
faulty trace and let m be the delay-bound of fault-tolerance. Consider an extension t of s such
that st ∈ L(G||S). Without loss of generality, |t| ≥ m or st deadlocks. In either case, there
exists u ∈ L(GN ||S) = pr(Lm(GN ||S)) and t = t′v such that |t′| ≤ m and uv ∈ L(G||S). Since
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u ∈ pr(Lm(GN ||S)), there exists v ∈ Lm(GN ||S)\{u} ⊆ Lm(G||S)\{u} = Lm(G||S)\{st′}. So
it follows that st′ ∈ pr(Lm(G||S)), which implies s ∈ pr(Lm(G||S)).
The following corollary is a specialization of Theorem 5, where the specification K for the
overall plant is simply a safety specification (so that K = pr(K)).
Corollary 4 Given a plant G = (X,Σ, α, x0, Xm) with nonfaulty part
GN = (XN ,Σ, αN , x0, XNm ), specification ∅ 6= K ⊆ Lm(G) for G and specification ∅ 6=
KN ⊆ Lm(GN ) for GN satisfying KN ⊆ K, there exists a nonmarking, nonblocking, (Σu,M)-
compatible and weakly fault-tolerant supervisor S such that
1. Lm(GN ||S) = KN , L(GN ||S) = pr(Lm(GN ||S)), and
2. L(G||S) = K.
if and only if
1. K is prefix-closed, controllable and observable with respect to G,
2. K\[K − pr(KN )] converges to K\pr(KN ),
3. KN = K ∩ Lm(GN ), and pr(KN ) = K ∩ L(GN ).
3.7 Application Example (Continued)
In order to illustrate weakly fault-tolerant control we revisit the power system con-
sidered in Section 4.6. We relax one of the assumptions that a fault cannot occur in one of the
recovery states. The corresponding revised model of the power system is shown in Figure 3.8.
Note the revised model has extra fault transitions.
It can be verified that reaching the recovery state 1101 or 1111 cannot be avoided starting
from a nonfaulty state. If the initial nonfaulty state is the normal state or the alert state,
then an in-extremis state 1110 or 1100 is reached uncontrollably (through a sequence of two
faults), from where the control action p0 must be executed to ensure the unreachability of the
failed state causing the system to reach either 1101 or 1111. On the other hand if the initial
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Figure 3.8 Revised model of power system of Figure 3.4
nonfaulty state is a recovery state (0001 or 0011), the recovery state 1101 or 1111 is reached
uncontrollably (through a sequence of two faults).
Consider any of the two recovery states, say 1101. If a controller disables both the repair
events at this state, then the system deadlocks and recovery to the nonfaulty part does not
occur. Similarly if one of the recovery events is not disabled, the state 1101 becomes part of a
cycle of faulty states and so a bounded-delay recovery to nonfaulty states is not guaranteed.
It follows that there does not exists a control so that the controlled system is fault-tolerant.
It turns out that there exists a control so that the controlled system is weakly fault-tolerant.
Such a controlled system is shown in Figure 3.9. The controller disables the c and c¯ transitions
between the emergency and the alert states, and also all the p¯ transitions. Due to the presence
of the cycles between the recovery states of the faulty part, the controlled system is not fault-
tolerant. However the controlled system is weakly fault-tolerant since the traces executable
from a recovery state in the faulty part (state 1001 or 1101 or 0101 or 1011 or 1111 or 0111)
are also executable from one of the recovery states of the nonfaulty part (state 0001 or 0011),
and from any faulty state a recovery state of the faulty part is reached within a bounded-delay.
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Figure 3.9 Supervised power system that is weakly fault-tolerant
3.8 Nonuniformly Bounded Fault-Tolerance
The notion of fault-tolerance we proposed requires the recovery to occur within a uni-
formly bounded delay. A relaxed notion of fault-tolerance is one where the delay bound for
recovery is finite but not necessarily uniformly bounded over all faulty traces. The following
definition formalizes the notions of nonuniformly-bounded fault-tolerance.
Definition 5 Given a plant G with its nonfaulty part GN , (G,GN ) is said to be nonuniformly-
bounded fault-tolerant if for s ∈ L(G) − L(GN ), exists m ∈ N such that for st ∈ L(G) with
|t| ≥ m or st deadlocks, exist u ∈ L(GN ) and t′ ≤ t with |t′| ≤ m and st′ ∼=G u. (G,GN ) is
said to be nonuniformly-bounded weakly fault-tolerant if for s ∈ L(G)− L(GN ), exists m ∈ N
such that for st ∈ L(G) with |t| ≥ m or st deadlocks, exist u ∈ L(GN ) and t′ ≤ t with t′ ≤ t
and st vG u.
Note in the above definition the delay bound m of fault-tolerance is a function of the
faulty trace s ∈ L(G) − L(GN ). While this is more general than the uniformly-bounded case
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considered earlier, we show below that when G and GN are finite-automata, the two notions
are equivalent.
Theorem 7 Suppose the plant G and its nonfaulty part GN are finite automata. Then
1. (G,GN ) is nonuniformly-bounded fault-tolerant if and only if (G,GN ) is fault-tolerant.
2. (G,GN ) is nonuniformly-bounded weakly fault-tolerant if and only if (G,GN ) is weakly
fault-tolerant.
Proof: We begin by proving the first part. Without loss of generality G is assumed to be
minimal. We show that when (G,GN ) is nonuniformly-bounded fault-tolerant, it holds that
X − XN ⊆ Ω(XN ) (which from Theorem 9 is equivalent to (G,GN ) being fault-tolerant).
Suppose for contradiction that this is not true. Then either there exists a cycle of states in
X −XN or some state in X −XN is a deadlocking state. Let s ∈ L(G) − L(GN ) be a trace
that ends on such a cycle or at such a deadlocking state. In the former case (when s ends on
a cycle), for every m ∈ N exists an extension st ∈ L(G) along the cycle such that all states
visited beyond the trace s belong to X−XN . From minimality of G, exists no t′ ≤ t such that
st′ ∼=G u for some u ∈ L(GN ), contradicting the fact that (G,GN ) is nonuniformly-bounded
fault-tolerant. The same conclusion is obtained in the latter case (when s ends at a deadlocking
state). This completes the proof of the first part.
To prove the second part, we consider the automaton T := (Z,Σ, γ, Z0, Zm) constructed in
Remark 2 and show that if (G,GN ) is nonuniformly-bounded weakly fault-tolerant, then Z ⊆
Ω(Ẑ), which as mentioned in Remark 2 is equivalent to the fact that Lm(G)\[L(G)− L(GN )]
converges to Lm(G)\L(GN ). (The convergence of L(G)\[L(G)− L(GN )] to L(G)\L(GN ) can
be proved similarly by setting Qm = Q in the definition of the automaton T = (Z,Σ, γ, Z0, Zm)
and establishing that Z ⊆ Ω(Ẑ).) Note together these two language convergence properties
are equivalent to (G,GN ) being weakly fault-tolerant (see Theorem 4).
Suppose for contradiction that Z 6⊆ Ω(Ẑ). Then either there exists a cycle of states
belonging to Z − Ẑ or some state in Z − Ẑ is a deadlocking state. In the former case, for any
m ∈ N , exists trace t ∈ Lm(T ) = Lm((Q,Σ, δ,Q−QN , Qm)) = Lm(G)\[L(G)− L(GN )] with
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|t| ≥ m such that no suffix of t belongs to Lm((Q,Σ, δ,QN , Qm)) = Lm(G)\L(GN ). So exists
s ∈ L(G)−L(GN ) such that st ∈ Lm(G) and t is arbitrarily long, yet there do not exist suffix
v of t and trace u ∈ L(GN ) such that uv ∈ Lm(G). This is a contradiction to the fact that
(G,GN ) is nonuniformly-bounded weakly fault-tolerant. The same conclusion can be arrived
at even in the latter case when Z− Ẑ possesses a deadlocking state. This completes the proof.
The following example shows that in general nonuniformly-bounded fault-tolerance is weaker
than the uniformly-bounded case.
Example 4 Consider a plant G and its nonfaulty part GN shown in Figure 3.10 with L(G) =
∪n≥1pr(anfbn), Lm(G) = {²} ∪n≥1 anfbn, L(GN ) = a∗, and Lm(GN ) = ∅, where f represents
the faulty event. Then L(G) − L(GN ) = ∪n≥1,m≤nanfbm. Pick sn = anf ∈ L(G) − L(GN ).
Then Lm(G)\{sn} = {bn} ⊆ Lm(G)\[L(G)− L(GN )]. The only suffix of bn that is equivalent
to a trace in L(GN ) = a∗ is the ² trace. So the delay-bound of fault-tolerance for the trace sn
is given by n (and is bounded). However this delay-bound grows unboundedly as the index n
of sn grows. We conclude that (G,GN ) is nonuniformly-bounded fault-tolerant, but it is not
fault-tolerant.
Figure 3.10 (G,GN ) that is only nonuniformly bounded fault-tolerant
3.9 Extension
Our framework can be modified to accommodate such a relaxation. In the initial part of
this chapter, where we required that post-recovery behavior be equivalent to some pre-fault
behavior, the condition of state-convergence will get replaced by the nonblockingness of the
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post-fault states with respect to the pre-fault states. In the later part of this chapter, where
we required that the post-recovery behavior be “simulated” by some pre-fault behavior, the
condition of language-convergence will get replaced by a weaker form, introduced as weak
language-stability in [Kumar, R. and Garg, V. K. and Marcus, S. I. (1993)] and as non-finite
language convergence in [Willner, Y. and Heymann, M. (1995)].
The following result characterizes the notions of nonuniformly-bounded fault-tolerance in-
troduced above.
Theorem 8 Consider a plant G = (X,Σ, δ, x0, Xm) and its nonfaulty part
GN = (XN ,Σ, δN , x0, XNm ), and suppose the corresponding minimal plant and its nonfaulty
part are Gmin = (Xmin,Σ, δmin, x0,min, Xm,min) and GNmin = (X
N
min,Σ, δ
N
min, x0,min, X
N
m,min)
respectively.
1. (G,GN ) is nonuniformly-bounded fault-tolerant if and only if Xmin is nonblocking with
respect to XNmin, i.e.,
x ∈ Xmin ⇒ ∃t ∈ Σ∗ : δmin(x, t) ∈ XNmin.
2. (G,GN ) is nonuniformly-bounded weakly fault-tolerant if and only if
L(G)\[L(G)− L(GN )] ⊆ Σ∗[L(G)\L(GN )],
Lm(G)\[L(G)− L(GN )] ⊆ Σ∗[(Lm(G)\L(GN )) ∪ {²}].
Proof: We begin by proving the first part. For the necessity suppose (G,GN ) is nonuniformly-
bounded fault-tolerant, and pick x ∈ Xmin. If x ∈ XNmin, we can set t = ²; else x ∈ Xmin−XNmin
and so exists s ∈ Σ∗ such that δmin(x0,min, s) = x, which implies s ∈ L(Gmin) − L(GNmin) =
L(G)−L(GN ). Then exist st ∈ L(G) = L(Gmin) and u ∈ L(GN ) = L(GNmin) such that st ∼=G u.
From minimality of Gmin, st and u reach the same state in Gmin. Since u ∈ L(Gmin), this
implies the state reached by u (and so also by st) belongs to XNmin. To prove the sufficiency, we
pick s ∈ L(G)−L(GN ) = L(Gmin)−L(GNmin) and let x ∈ Xmin−XNmin be the state reached by
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s. From hypothesis, exists t ∈ Σ∗ such that δmin(x, t) ∈ XNmin. Let u ∈ L(GNmin) = L(GN ) be
a trace such that δNmin(x0, u) = δmin(x, t). Then it is clear that st ∼=Gmin u, which is equivalent
to st ∼=G u.
For the necessity of the second part suppose (G,GN ) is nonuniformly-bounded weakly
fault-tolerant, and pick traces t ∈ L(G)\[L(G) − L(GN )], and t′ ∈ Lm(G)\[L(G) − L(GN )].
Then since ² ∈ L(G)\L(GN ), t ∈ Σ∗[L(G)\L(GN )]. Similarly since ² ∈ (Lm(G)\L(GN ))∪{²},
t′ ∈ Σ∗[(Lm(G)\L(GN )) ∪ {²}].
Remark 3 Algorithms for verifying both nonblockingness (equivalently backward-reachability)
and weak language-stability are well-understood. It turns out that both these properties can
be polynomially verified. So by relaxing the notion of fault-tolerance to allow nonuniform delay
bound for recovery, one gains on the computational complexity of verifying the existence of a
fault-tolerant control.
3.10 Conclusion
We presented a framework for fault-tolerant supervisory control. Notations of fault-
tolerance and weakly fault-tolerance have been proposed. Given a plant along with its non-
faulty part, the goal of a fault-tolerant supervisory control is to enforce a specification for the
nonfaulty plant and another (perhaps more liberal) specification for the overall plant, and also
to ensure a bounded delay recovery up on the occurrence of a fault. Recovery implies that the
ensuing behaviors are equivalent to those starting from a nonfaulty state. In case of weak fault-
tolerance, recovery implies that the ensuing behaviors are subsumed by those starting from a
nonfaulty state. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of fault-tolerant as well
as weakly fault-tolerant supervisor are provided. The condition involves the usual notions of
controllability, observability and relative-closure, together with the notion of stability. The
notion of state-stability is needed for fault-tolerance, whereas the weak fault-tolerance requires
the notion of language-stability. Algorithms to verify state-stability are presented in [Brave,
Y. and Heymann, M. (1990)], [O¨zveren, C. M. and Willsky, A. S. and Antsaklis, P. J. (1991)]
and are of linear complexity. Algorithms to verify language-stability are presented in [Kumar,
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R. and Garg, V. K. and Marcus, S. I. (1993)], [Willner, Y. and Heymann, M. (1995)]; the
complexity is polynomial in the plant language (the language which needs to converge) and
quadratic-exponential in the specification language (the language to which the convergence
occurs). We also introduced the notion of nonuniformly-bounded fault-tolerance (and its weak
version) where the delay-bound for recovery is not uniformly bounded over the set of faulty
traces, and showed that this notion is equivalent to the notion of “uniformly-bounded fault-
tolerance” considered earlier when the underlying system is one of finitely many states. Future
work will explore the synthesis of maximally-permissive fault-tolerant supervisors.
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CHAPTER 4. Synthesis of Optimal Fault-Tolerant Supervisor for Discrete
Event Systems
In an earlier work [Wen, Q. and Kumar, R. and Huang, J. and Liu, H. (2007a)], [Wen,
Q. and Kumar, R. and Huang, J. and Liu, H. (2007b)], [Wen, Q. and Kumar, R. and
Huang, J. and Liu, H. (2008)], we introduced a framework for fault-tolerant supervisory
control of discrete event systems and presented a necessary and sufficient condition for its
existence. In this paper, we introduce the synthesis of an optimal fault-tolerant supervisory
controller. Given a discrete event plant with both faulty and nonfaulty behaviors, an optimal
fault-tolerant supervisor we synthesize enforces a set of behaviors in which (i) a recovery
is guaranteed within a bounded delay following any fault, (ii) the enforced set of nonfaulty
behaviors are maximized, and (iii) the enforced set of faulty behaviors prior to the recovery
are minimized. The computation has complexity quadratic in the size of plant. The optimal
fault-tolerant supervisor possesses another useful property: It minimizes the recovery-delay for
any faulty state. A practical example is given to illustrate the approach.
4.1 Introduction
Discrete Event Systems (DESs) are systems with discrete states that evolve in response to
events [Ramadge, P. J. andWonham, W. M. (1987)], [Kumar, R. and Garg, V. K. (1995)]. Ex-
amples include manufacturing systems, communication protocols, reactive software, and asyn-
chronous hardware. A goal of supervisory control [Ramadge, P. J. andWonham, W. M. (1987)],
[Kumar, R. and Garg, V. K. (1995)] of such systems is to enforce a given specification by re-
stricting the behavior of a given system (called plant). The supervisory role is characterized by
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the fact that at any given plant state, the supervisor determines a set of controllable events to
be enabled, so that the plant evolves over enabled events (including the uncontrollable events)
without violating a given specification.
In an earlier work [Wen, Q. and Kumar, R. and Huang, J. and Liu, H. (2007a)], [Wen,
Q. and Kumar, R. and Huang, J. and Liu, H. (2007b)], [Wen, Q. and Kumar, R. and Huang,
J. and Liu, H. (2008)], we introduced a framework for fault-tolerant supervisory control of
discrete event systems and presented a necessary and sufficient condition for its existence.
Fault-tolerance is a property requiring that a system continues to function, possibly with a
degraded performance, even when some of its components fail. Given a plant G, possessing
both faulty and nonfaulty behaviors, and a submodel GN for the nonfaulty part, the goal of
fault-tolerant control is to enforce a certain specification KN for the nonfaulty plant GN and
another (perhaps more liberal) specification K ⊇ KN for the overall plant G, and further to
ensure that the plant recovers from any fault within a bounded delay, so that following the
recovery the system state is equivalent to a nonfaulty state (as if no fault ever happened). A
fault is modeled as an uncontrollable event, occurrence of which may cause a transition from the
nonfaulty part to the faulty part. Either of the specifications KN and K can be used to specify
both the safety and the progress requirements. Since a degraded performance may be tolerable
after the occurrence of a fault, the second specification is more liberal than the first one (and
so it allows a larger set of traces). The condition for the existence of a fault-tolerant controller
involves the usual notions of controllability, observability and relative-closure, together with
the notion of stability [Brave, Y. and Heymann, M. (1990)], [O¨zveren, C. M. and Willsky,
A. S. and Antsaklis, P. J. (1991)], which is used to establish bounded delay recovery from a
fault.
Fault-tolerance is a property requiring that a system continues to function, perhaps with a
degraded performance, even when some of its components fail. In applications, fault-tolerance
is achieved by using redundancy. Following the occurrences of failures, a fault-tolerant system
can continue its proper operation, although the operation may be degraded. Fault-tolerance
requires the ability of recovering from faulty behaviors. That is, the system should resume
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normal functionality, fully or partially, in finite time. The notion of fault-tolerance is a type of
state-stability [Brave, Y. and Heymann, M. (1990)], [O¨zveren, C. M. and Willsky, A. S. and
Antsaklis, P. J. (1991)] property. If a system is not originally fault-tolerant, it could be made
so using appropriate control. The purpose of fault-tolerant control is to have the controlled
system achieve fault-tolerance.
There has been some prior work on fault-tolerant control of DESs (see for example [Jensen,
R. M. (2003)]). Some involved controller switching upon the occurrence of a fault as in
[Darabi, H. and Jafari, M. A. and Buczak, A. L. (2003)], or re-computation of a controller
as in [Rohloff, K. R. (2005)]. The resulting controlled system can tolerate some faults but
the system performance after faults will remain degraded since the notion of recovery from
faults was not incorporated. Case studies involving synthesis of fault-tolerant supervisors can
also be found in [Cho, K. -H. and Lim, J. -T. (1996)], [Cho, K. -H. and Lim, J. -T. (1998)],
[Zhou, M. C. and Dicesare, F. (1989)]. Design of certain coordination protocols for automated
highway systems to achieve fault-tolerance under vehicle failures is reported in [Lygeros, J.
and Godbole, D. N. and Broucke, M. (2000)], [Godbole, D. N. and Lygeros, J. and Singh,
E. and Deshpande, A. and Lindsey, A. E. (2000)]. Takai et al. considered the problem of
reliable decentralized supervisory control [Takai, S. and Ushio, T. (2000)], where they studied
fault-tolerance with respect to the failures of the supervisors. Fault-tolerance in Petri Net is
considered in [Iordache, M. V. and Antsaklis, P. J. (2004)], where liveness enforcing strategies
are designed to deal with failures using system reconfigurations. In [Lafortune, S. and Lin,
F. (1991)], authors considered a pair of specifications, representing the desired and the (more
liberal) tolerable behavior for a plant.
In this chapter we study the synthesis of an optimal fault-tolerant supervisory controller
when the required existence conditions (as reported in [Wen, Q. and Kumar, R. and Huang,
J. and Liu, H. (2007a)], [Wen, Q. and Kumar, R. and Huang, J. and Liu, H. (2007b)],
[Wen, Q. and Kumar, R. and Huang, J. and Liu, H. (2008)]) are not satisfied. An optimal
fault-tolerant supervisor we synthesize enforces a set of behaviors in which (i) a recovery
is guaranteed within a bounded delay following any fault, (ii) the enforced set of nonfaulty
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behaviors are maximized, and (iii) the enforced set of faulty behaviors prior to the recovery are
minimized. Given (G,GN ), where G is a plant and GN is its nonfaulty part, and a state-based
specification (Xg, Xgm) representing legal states and legal final states respectively, we compute
a subplant (G˜, G˜N ) such that (i) G˜N (v GN ) is a maximal controllable subplant of GN for
which there exists G′ with G˜N v G′ v G and (G′, G˜N ) is fault-tolerant, (ii) G˜ is a minimal
such G′, and (iii) safety and nonblockingness properties are satisfied. The above is guided by
the goal to maximize the achievable nonfaulty behaviors and at the same time minimize the
faulty behaviors that must be tolerated, without having to sacrifice safety, nonblockingness,
and recovery.
We show that G˜N can be uniquely chosen (since the corresponding property is closed
under union), whereas nonunique minimal choices exist for G˜ (the corresponding property is
closed under the intersection over decreasing chains). We present an algorithm, of complexity
quadratic in the size of G, for computing (G˜, G˜N ) and illustrate the algorithm through an
example. It utilizes another new algorithm presented in the chapter for computing a minimal
subplant in which the attraction of one set of states is guaranteed to another set of states.
The remainder of this paper is organized as following. Section 4.2 gives the basic notation
and preliminaries. Section 4.3 formulates the synthesis of an optimal fault-tolerant supervisor.
Section 4.4 provides an algorithm for the computation of such a supervisor and an illustra-
tive example. Section 4.5 proves the optimality of the recovery delay in the controlled plant
computed by the algorithm of Section 4.4. Section 4.6 gives a practical application example.
Section 4.7 concludes the paper. The paper is based on a prior conference version [Wen, Q.
and Kumar, R. and Huang, J. (2008)], extended to include new results and new application.
4.2 Preliminaries and Notations
A DES to be controlled, called plant, is modeled as an automaton, denoted by a five
tuple G := (X,Σ, α, x0, Xm), where X denotes the set of states, Σ denotes the finite set of
events, α : X × Σ → X denotes the partial deterministic state transition function, x0 ∈ X
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denotes the initial state, and Xm ⊆ X denotes the set of marked states. For x ∈ X, we use
Σ(x) ⊆ Σ to denote the set of events defined at x, i.e., Σ(x) := {σ ∈ Σ | α(x, σ) is defined}.
For x ∈ X,σ ∈ Σ(x), (x, σ, α(x, σ)) is called a transition of G.
Σ∗ is used to denote the set of all finite-length sequences of events, called traces, which
includes the zero-length trace ². The length of a trace s, denoted as |s|, is defined to be the
number of events in the trace. A subset of Σ∗ is called a language. The generated language
of G, denoted as L(G) ⊆ Σ∗, contains all traces s for which α(x0, s) is defined. The marked
language of G, denoted as Lm(G), contains all generated traces that reach a marked state.
Given two automata G1 := (X1,Σ, α1, x01 , Xm1) and G2 := (X2,Σ, α2, x02 , Xm2), G1 is said
to be a subautomaton of G2, denoted as G1 v G2, if there exists an injective map h : X1 → X2
such that ∀s ∈ L(G1) : h(α1(x01 , s)) = α2(x02 , s). Given a plant G = (X,σ.α, x0.Xm), a subset
of states X̂, and a subset of transitions ∆, the subplant of G restricted to (X̂,∆), is given by,
G |
(X̂,∆)
:= (X̂,Σ, α|
X̂,∆
, x0, Xm ∩ X̂), where for x ∈ X̂, σ ∈ Σ,
α |
(X̂,∆)
(x, σ) :=

α(x, σ) if α(x, σ) ∈ X̂, (x, σ, α(x, σ)) ∈ ∆
undefined otherwise
It is possible that ∆ is not specified, in which case G |
X̂
is same as G |
(X̂,X×Σ×X).
For traces s and t, we use s ≤ t to denote that s is a prefix of t and s < t to denote that s
is a proper prefix of t. For a language K ⊆ Σ∗, pr(K), called the prefix-closure of K, denotes
the set of all prefixes of traces in K, i.e., pr(K) = {s ∈ Σ∗ | ∃t ∈ K : s ≤ t}. It is clear
that K ⊆ pr(K), and K is said to be prefix-closed if K = pr(K). A language K is said to be
relative-closed with respect to G, if pr(K) ∩ Lm(G) = K ∩ Lm(G).
We use K\s to denote the set of traces that occur in the language K after the trace s has
occurred, i.e., L\s := {t ∈ Σ∗ | st ∈ L}. For traces s and t, we use s vG t to denote that the
sets of traces that occur in the generated and the marked languages of G after s are contained
in those after t, i.e., L(G)\s ⊆ L(G)\t and Lm(G)\s ⊆ Lm(G)\t. We write s ∼=G t if s vG t
and t vG s. s ∼=G t implies the equivalence of the behaviors following s and t, whereas s vG t
implies the behaviors following s are subsumed by the behaviors following t.
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Definition 6 [Brave, Y. and Heymann, M. (1990)] Given a plant G = (X,Σ, α, x0, Xm)
and a state set X̂ ⊆ X, x ∈ X is said to be X̂ − attractable in G if there exists m ∈ N such
that for all t for which α(x, t) is defined and either |t| ≥ m or t deadlocks, exists t′ ≤ t with
|t′| ≤ m such that α(x, t′) ∈ X̂. m is called the delay bound of convergence. x ∈ X is said to be
controllably X̂ − attractable in G if there exists a supervisor S such that x is X̂ − attractable
in G‖S.
We use ΩG(X̂), called the region of attraction of X̂, to denote the set of all X̂-attractable
states, and X̂ is called an attractor for the set ΩG(X̂). We use ΩcG(X̂), called the region of
controllable-attraction of X̂, to denote the set of all controllably X̂-attractable states, and X̂
is called a controlled-attractor for the set ΩcG(X̂). A state set X˜ ⊆ X is said to be attractable
to X̂ if X˜ ⊆ ΩG(X̂) and controllably-attractable to X̂ if X˜ ⊆ ΩcG(X̂). Clearly, X̂ ⊆ ΩG(X̂) ⊆
ΩcG(X̂).
For control purposes, the event set of G is partitioned into the set of controllable events
Σc ⊆ Σ and the set of uncontrollable events Σu ⊆ Σ. A language K is said to be controllable
(with respect to G and Σu) if pr(K)Σu ∩ L(G) ⊆ pr(K).
A supervisor is another automaton S := (Y,Σ, β, y0, Ym). The supervised plant is the syn-
chronous composition of G and S, denoted G||S := (X × Y,Σ, γ, (x0, y0), Xm × Ym), where
for (x, y) ∈ X × Y and σ ∈ Σ, γ((x, y), σ) is defined if and only if both α(x, σ) and β(y, σ)
are defined and in which case, γ((x, y), σ) = (α(x, σ), β(y, σ)). It can be concluded that the
generated and the marked languages of the supervised plant satisfy: L(G||S) = L(G) ∩ L(S)
and Lm(G||S) = Lm(G) ∩ Lm(S), respectively. A supervisor S is said to be (i) nonmark-
ing if Lm(G||S) = L(G||S) ∩ Lm(G), (ii) nonblocking if pr(Lm(G||S)) = L(G||S), and (iii)
Σu-compatible if it does not disable any uncontrollable event (equivalently if L(G||S) is con-
trollable). It is known that given a nonempty specification language K ⊆ Lm(G), there exists
a Σu-compatible, nonmarking and nonblocking supervisor if and only if K is relative-closed
and controllable [Ramadge, P. J. and Wonham, W. M. (1987)], [Kumar, R. and Garg,
V. K. (1995)].
The following notion of fault-tolerance was introduced in [Wen, Q. and Kumar, R. and
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Huang, J. and Liu, H. (2007a)], [Wen, Q. and Kumar, R. and Huang, J. and Liu,
H. (2007b)], [Wen, Q. and Kumar, R. and Huang, J. and Liu, H. (2008)].
Definition 7 Consider a pair of languages (H,HN ) with HN ⊆ H. The pair (H,HN ) is said
to be fault-tolerant if exists m ∈ N such that for s ∈ pr(H)−pr(HN ), st ∈ pr(H) with |t| ≥ m
or st deadlocks, there exist u ∈ pr(HN ) and t′ ≤ t with |t′| ≤ m and st′ ∼=G u. In this case,
m is called the delay-bound of fault-tolerance. Given a plant G with its nonfaulty part GN ,
(G,GN ) is said to be fault-tolerant if (L(G), L(GN )) is fault-tolerant. A supervisor S is said
to be fault-tolerant if (G‖S,GN‖S) is fault-tolerant.
The following theorems were obtained in [Wen, Q. and Kumar, R. and Huang, J. and
Liu, H. (2007a)], [Wen, Q. and Kumar, R. and Huang, J. and Liu, H. (2007b)], [Wen, Q.
and Kumar, R. and Huang, J. and Liu, H. (2008)].
Theorem 9 ([Wen, Q. and Kumar, R. and Huang, J. and Liu, H. (2007a)], [Wen, Q.
and Kumar, R. and Huang, J. and Liu, H. (2007b)], [Wen, Q. and Kumar, R. and
Huang, J. and Liu, H. (2008)]) Consider a plant G = (X,Σ, δ, x0, Xm) and its nonfaulty part
GN = (XN ,Σ, δN , x0, XNm ), and suppose the corresponding minimal plant and its nonfaulty
part are Gmin = (Xmin,Σ, δmin, x0,min, Xm,min) and GNmin = (X
N
min,Σ, δ
N
min, x0,min, X
N
m,min)
respectively. (G,GN ) is fault-tolerant if and only if Xmin is attractable to XNmin, i.e., Xmin ⊆
ΩGmin(X
N
min).
Theorem 10 ([Wen, Q. and Kumar, R. and Huang, J. and Liu, H. (2007a)], [Wen,
Q. and Kumar, R. and Huang, J. and Liu, H. (2007b)], [Wen, Q. and Kumar, R. and
Huang, J. and Liu, H. (2008)]) Given a plant G = (X,Σ, α, x0, Xm) with nonfaulty part
GN = (XN ,Σ, αN , x0, XNm ), specification ∅ 6= K ⊆ Lm(G) for G and specification ∅ 6= KN ⊆
Lm(GN ) for GN satisfying KN ⊆ K, there exists a nonmarking, nonblocking (with respect to
both GN and G), Σu-compatible and fault-tolerant supervisor S such that
1. Lm(GN ||S) = KN , L(GN ||S) = pr(Lm(GN ||S)), and
2. Lm(G||S) = K and L(G||S) = pr(Lm(G||S))
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if and only if
1. K is relative-closed and controllable with respect to G,
2. (K,KN ) is fault-tolerant, and
3. KN = K ∩ Lm(GN ) and pr(KN ) = pr(K) ∩ L(GN ).
4.3 Formulation of Optimal Fault-Tolerant Control Synthesis Problem
Theorem 10 provides a condition under which a desired fault-tolerant supervisor exists.
When this condition is satisfied, a trim recognizer of K can be chosen as a supervisor. Here we
study the problem of synthesizing a fault-tolerant supervisor when the condition of Theorem 10
is not satisfied. A desirable goal is to maximize the achievable nonfaulty behaviors and at the
same time minimize the faulty behaviors that must be tolerated, without sacrificing safety,
nonblockingness and recovery. The motivation being, we allow maximal functionality of the
system in the absence of faults, and at the same time limit the system’s faulty behavior within
a minimal range without sacrificing recovery.
It turns out that the supremal nonfaulty fault-tolerant behavior does not exist in general.
That is, given a language pair (K,KN ), we cannot always find a fault-tolerant sublanguage
pair (K˜, K˜N ), where K˜ ⊆ K and K˜N ⊆ KN , such that any other fault-tolerant sublanguage
pair (K̂, K̂N ) satisfies K̂ ⊆ K˜ and K̂N ⊆ K˜N .
Consider the following example for illustration. Figure 4.1 shows a plantG and its nonfaulty
part GN , where f is a faulty event and is the only uncontrollable event. From Figure 4.2, we
can see that there are two subplant pairs (G1, GN1 ) and (G2, G
N
2 ), which are fault-tolerant.
Note in (G1, GN1 ) the faulty state 6 is equivalent to the nonfaulty state 3, whereas in (G2, G
N
2 )
the faulty state 6 is equivalent to the nonfaulty state 2. Thus in both cases the system
reaches a state that is equivalent to a nonfaulty state within one transition of the occurrence
of the fault (i.e., the delay bound for recovery is one in both cases). However the language
(L(G1) ∪ L(G2), L(GN1 ) ∪ L(GN2 )) which is realized by (G,GN ) shown in Figure 4.1 is not
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fault-tolerant. This is because there exists no nonfaulty state that is equivalent to the faulty
state 6 where the system can stay with recovery.
Figure 4.1 Plant G with its nonfaulty part GN
Figure 4.2 Two fault-tolerant subplants
It happens that maximal nonfaulty behaviors that are fault-tolerant also do not exist, for
the limit of a class of monotonically increasing nonfaulty fault-tolerant behaviors may not be
fault-tolerant. To see this, consider the monotonically increasing sequence of plant behaviors
shown in Figure 4.3, where the nth behavior in the sequence is generated by the plant (Gn, GNn ).
The nonfaulty part GNn contains n a’s, whereas the overall plant Gn contains a faulty trace
with same number of b’s, i.e., the delay bound for recovery in (Gn, GNn ) is n. The limiting plant
behavior (L(G∞) := ∪nL(Gn), L(GN∞) := ∪nL(GNn )) (see Figure 4.4) is not fault-tolerant since
the faulty plant can execute an unbounded number of b’s before a recovery to the nonfaulty
part occurs.
The examples above show that neither the supremal nor a maximal nonfaulty fault-tolerant
sublanguage exists in general. Lack of supremal and even maximal nonfaulty fault-tolerant
sublanguages motivate us to restrict our attention to state-feedback based control, under which
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Figure 4.3 Plant (Gn, GNn ), n ≥ 1
Figure 4.4 Plant (G∞, GN∞)
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the controlled plant is always a subplant of the uncontrolled plant. In this setting, we are able
to show the existence of fault-tolerant control that maximizes the nonfaulty behavior while
minimizing the faulty behavior without sacrificing safety, nonblockingness, and recovery.
Without loss of generality, the specification is given as a state set pair (Xg, Xgm), where
Xg ⊆ X is the set of legal states and Xgm ⊆ Xg∩Xm is the set of legal final states. Since under
a state-feedback control the controlled plant is a subplant of the uncontrolled plant, examining
various state-feedback controllers is equivalent to examining various subplants of a given plant.
We first define the set of all fault-tolerant subplants, denoted F (G,GN ) as follows:
Definition 8 Given a plant model (G,GN ) with GN v G, the class of fault-tolerant subplants,
denoted F (G,GN ), is the set of all subplants (G˜ v G, G˜N v GN ) with state set pair (X˜, X˜N )
and marked state set pair (X˜m, X˜Nm ), such that
• X˜ ⊆ Xg, X˜m ⊆ Xgm;
• Lm(G˜) is relatively closed and controllable with respect to G;
• X˜ ⊆ ΩG˜(X˜N ).
Remark 4 Since G˜N represents the nonfaulty subplant and G˜ represents the overall subplant,
our goal is to maximize G˜N (which will maximize nonfaulty behavior), and at the same time
minimize G˜ (which will minimize the fault behavior). In doing so, we want to ensure that
(G˜, G˜N ) ∈ F (G,GN ).
We next introduce the class of fault-tolerant nonfaulty subplants and show that this class
is closed under union.
Definition 9 The class of fault-tolerant nonfaulty subplants is defined as:
FNG (G
N ) := {G˜N v GN | ∃G˜ v G : (G˜, G˜N ) ∈ F (G,GN )}.
The following theorem shows that the above class of fault-tolerant nonfaulty subplants is
closed under union.
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Theorem 11 Let Λ be an index set such that ∀λ ∈ Λ, GNλ ∈ FNG (GN ). Then
⋃
λ∈ΛGNλ ∈
FNG (G
N ).
Proof: We show the existence of G′ v ∪λGλ such that (G′,∪λGNλ ) ∈ F (G,GN ).
Suppose (∪λGλ,∪λGNλ ) is fault-tolerant. Then we claim that we can choose G′ = ∪λGλ.
Since for each λ, Xλ ⊆ Xg, we have ∪λXλ ⊆ Xg. Since for each λ, Lm(Gλ) is controllable
which means no uncontrollable event is disabled in G to obtain each Gλ, it is the case that
no uncontrollable event is disabled to obtain ∪λGλ, i.e., Lm(∪λGλ) is controllable. Since for
each λ, Lm(Gλ) is relatively-closed which implies that Xλ ∩Xm ⊆ Xλ ∩Xgm, it is the case that
∪λXλ ∩Xm ⊆ ∪λXλ ∩Xgm, i.e., Lm(∪λGλ) is relatively-closed.
On the other hand suppose (∪λGλ,∪λGNλ ) is not fault-tolerant. Then exists a cycle in
the faulty part. Since for each λ, (Gλ, GNλ ) is fault-tolerant which implies the faulty part
of Gλ does not contain any cycle, i.e., a certain edge of each faulty-part cycle of ∪λGλ is
missing in Gλ. Then each such edge must be labeled with a controllable event (since Lm(Gλ)
is controllable). Let G′ be obtained from by removing each edge that contributes to a cycle in
the faulty-part of ∪λGλ and is missing in Gλ¯ for a λ¯ ∈ Λ. Then the faulty-part of G′ is acyclic.
Also since only controllable edges are removed to obtain G′ from ∪λGλ, the controllability
property is preserved. Since Lm(∪λGλ) is controllable (see above), we can claim that Lm(G′)
is controllable. Further since G′ is obtained from ∪λGλ by removing certain edges that appear
as part of certain cycles, the state set is preserved upon the removal of such edges (i.e., X ′ =
∪λXλ). It can then be concluded that relative-closure property is also preserved, and so Lm(G′)
is also relatively-closed.
It remains to show that (G′,∪λGNλ ) is fault-tolerant. Since the faulty-part of G′ is acyclic,
it suffices to show that for any faulty state x ∈ X ′ = ∪λXλ exists a path in G′ to the nonfaulty
part ∪λXNλ . Pick any such state x. Then exists λ such that x is a faulty state of Gλ. From
the fault-tolerance of (Gλ, GNλ ), exists a path in Gλ from x to G
N
λ v ∪λGNλ . If this path does
not contain any of the edges that were removed to obtain G′, then we are done. Otherwise this
path visits a state x¯ from where an edge that is present in ∪λGλ but is missing in Gλ¯ has been
removed. From the fault-tolerance of (Gλ¯, G
N
λ¯
) exists a path in Gλ¯ v G′ from x¯ to GNλ¯ v G′.
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This concludes the proof.
Since FNG (G
N ) is closed under union, it possesses a supremal element, supFNG (G
N ) ∈
FNG (G
N ), with the property that if G˜N ∈ FNG (GN ), then G˜N v supFNG (GN ).
In the above, we defined a class of fault-tolerant nonfaulty subplants. Next, given a non-
faulty subplant, we define a class of overall subplant that is fault-tolerant.
Definition 10 Given G˜N v GN , the class of overall subplants that are fault-tolerant wrt G˜N
is defined as:
FG˜N (G) := {G˜ v G|(G˜, G˜N ) ∈ F (G,GN )}.
G˜ is an infimal element of FG˜N (G) if G˜ ∈ FG˜N (G), and G′ ∈ FG˜N (G) implies G˜ v G′. G˜ is
a minimal element of FG˜N (G) if G˜ ∈ FG˜N (G) and G′ v G˜ implies G′ 6∈ FG˜N (G).
The following result establishes certain closure properties of FG˜N (G) under intersection.
Theorem 12 FG˜N (G) does not possess infimal element but possess minimal elements when-
ever it is nonempty.
Proof: For the first part, we show that FG˜N (G) is not closed under intersection. As seen
from Figure 4.5, G1, G2 ∈ FGN (G1 ∪G2) (since for each i = 1, 2, (Gi, GN ) ∈ F (G1 ∪G2, GN )).
However it is clear from Figure 4.5 that (G1 ∩ G2, GN ) 6∈ F (G1 ∪ G2, GN ), i.e., G1 ∩ G2 6∈
FGN (G1 ∪G2).
Figure 4.5 (G1, G˜N ) and (G2, G˜N ) are fault-tolerant, but (G1 ∩G2, G˜N ) is
not
Next we consider the second part. Since G has finite number of states and transitions, the
number of subplants of G is finite. So, whenever FG˜N (G) is nonempty, there exist at least one
subplant of G in FG˜N (G) for which there exists no subplant in the set FG˜N (G), and so the
existence of a minimal overall subplant that is fault-tolerant with respect to G˜N follows.
70
The set of all the minimal elements of FG˜N (G) is denoted as MINFG˜N (G), and a minimal
element is denoted as minFG˜N (G).
4.4 Computation of Optimal Fault-Tolerant Control
We set out the goal of synthesizing an optimal fault-tolerant control that maximizes the
achievable nonfaulty behavior, minimizes the achievable faulty behavior and ensures safety,
nonblockingness and bounded-delay recovery. The computation of such a fault-tolerant state-
feedback control for a given plant (G,GN ) with state set (X,XN ) and specification (Xg, Xgm),
where Xg ⊆ X,Xgm ⊆ Xg ∩ Xm, requires the computation of a subplant pair (G˜, G˜N ) with
state set (X˜, X˜N ), where G˜N = supFNG (G
N ), and G˜ ∈ MINFG˜N (G).
The computation of an optimal fault-tolerant control discussed above requires the com-
putation of the region of controllable-attraction and a minimal set of transition for achieving
the controllable-attractability. The following algorithm computes the region of controllable-
attraction ΩcG(X̂) of states in X̂ ⊆ X for a plant G, and is obtained by extending the one
given in [Kumar, R. and Garg, V. K. and Marcus, S. I. (1993)] to keep track of a minimal set
of transitions that must be enabled to achieve the controllable-attractability. Also, whenever
α(X̂,Σ∗u) ⊆ ΩcG(X̂), the algorithm computes a minimal fault-tolerant subplant ΥG(X̂) with
the nonfaulty states X̂.
Algorithm 1 Consider a plant G = (X,Σ, α, x0, Xm) and a state set X̂ ⊆ X.
1. Initialization step:
k = 0, Ω−1 = ∅, Ω0 = X̂, ∆0 = ∅.
2. Iteration step:
• Ωk+1 = Ωk ∪ {x ∈ X − Ωk|α(x,Σ) ∩ Ωk − Ωk−1 6= ∅, α(x,Σu) ⊆ Ωk}.
• ∆k+1 = ∆k ∪ {(x, σ, x′) | α(x, σ) = x′, x ∈ Ωk+1 − Ωk, σ ∈ Σu ∪ Σx, x′ ∈ Ωk}, where
Σx = ∅ if α(x,Σu) 6= ∅ and otherwise Σx = {σx} such that α(x, σx) ∈ Ωk.
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3. Termination step:
If Ωk+1 6= Ωk, then increment k by 1 and iterate; else ΩcG(X̂) := Ωk, ∆G(X̂) := ∆k, and
ΥG(X̂) := G|X¯,∆¯, where X¯ := {x ∈ X¯|∃x1 ∈ α(X̂,Σ∗u), {(xi, σi, xi+1) ∈ ∆G(X̂)}ni=1 :
xn+1 = x}, ∆¯ := {(x, σ, x′) ∈ ∆G(X̂) | x ∈ X¯}.
Remark 5 The complexity of Algorithm 1 can be seen to be linear in the size of plant G.
This is because at most |X| iterations are being performed, and in each iteration a constant
amount of computation is being done.
Algorithm 1 computes the region of controllable-attraction of X̂, by iteratively adding
controllably attractable states with increasing delay bound of convergence, and also keeps a
record of a minimal set of transitions that must remain enabled at the states included in the
region of controllable attraction. Note a (single) controllable transition is included (this is the
transition used for recovery) only when no uncontrollable transitions are defined at that state.
This ensures the minimality of the enabled transitions.
A desired minimal subplant is obtained by including only the minimally required states of
the region of controllable attraction, and only the transitions originating at those states that
belong to the minimal set of transitions required for controllable attraction. The minimality of
the states included follows from the fact that only those faulty states that are reachable from a
nonfaulty state by executing a sequence of uncontrollable transitions, followed by a sequence of
transitions belonging to the minimal set of transitions required for controllable attraction, are
included in the minimal subplant. It then follows that the computed subplant is minimal. This
is stated in the following theorem, the proof of which follows from the preceding discussion.
Theorem 13 Given a plant G = (X,Σ, α, x0, Xm) and state sets X˜, X̂ ⊆ X such that X˜ ⊆
ΩcG(X̂), ΥG(X̂) computed by Algorithm 1 is a minimal fault-tolerant subplant with nonfaulty
part X̂.
The following algorithm computes a fault-tolerant subplant (G˜N , G˜) such that G˜N =
supFNG (G
N ) and G˜ ∈ MINFG˜N (G).
72
Algorithm 2 Consider plantG = (X,Σ, α, x0, Xm) with nonfaulty partGN = (XN ,Σ, αN , x0, XNm ),
and specification (Xg, Xgm).
Uncontrollable/blocking states removal:
1. Initialization step:
k = 0, Xgk := X
g.
2. Iteration step:
If x0 6∈ Xgk , then terminate (no solution exists); else
• Xgk+1 := {x ∈ Xgk | α(x,Σ∗u) ⊆ Xgk , α|Xgk (x,Σ
∗) ∩Xgm 6= ∅}.
3. Termination step: If Xgk+1 6= Xgk , increment k by 1 and iterate; else
G|Xg
k
=: G¯ = (X¯,Σ, α¯, x0, X¯m), and GN |Xg
k
=: G¯N = (X¯N ,Σ, α¯N , x0, X¯Nm ).
Optimal fault-tolerant subplant computation:
1. Initialization step:
k = 0, XNk := X¯
N .
2. Iteration step:
If x0 6∈ XNk , then terminate (no solution exists); else
• XNk+1 := {x ∈ XNk | α¯(x,Σ∗u) ⊆ ΩcG¯(XNk ), α¯|ΩcG¯(XNk )(x,Σ
∗) ∩ (XNk ∩Xgm) 6= ∅}.
3. Termination step:
If XNk+1 6= XNk , increment k by 1 and iterate; else
• X˜N = XNk , G˜N := G¯N |X˜N ;
• G˜ := ΥG¯(X˜N ).
The steps of Algorithm 2 can be understood as follows. The “uncontrollable/blocking
states removal” step computes the subplant that recognizes the supremal relative-closed and
controllable sublanguage by keeping only those legal states X¯ ⊆ Xg that are controllable
(invariant under the executions of uncontrollable transitions) and nonblocking (can reach a
legal final state in Xgm while staying inside X¯). This provides a supremal safe and nonblocking
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subplant (G¯, G¯N ). Additional states in X¯N may need to be removed to satisfy fault-tolerance
since the faulty states in the uncontrollable reach of X¯N may not be controllably-attractable to
X¯N . This is accomplished in the “optimal fault-tolerant subplant computation” step. Starting
from the initial iteration in which k = 0 and XNk = X¯
N , the kth iteration obtains a subset
XNk+1 by retaining only those states in X
N
k whose uncontrollable reach is within the region of
controllable-attraction of XNk and that are nonblocking with respect to the marked states in
XNk ∩Xgm while staying inside the region of controllable-attraction of XNk . This maximizes the
set of nonfaulty behaviors. To minimize the faulty behavior, we should only keep those states
in Xk as part of Xk+1 that are uncontrollably reachable from the nonfaulty part, i.e., the states
in αk(XNk+1,Σ
∗
u). However not all such states may be controllably-attractable to X
N
k+1. Xk+1
is hence chosen to be a minimal controlled-attractor for those states of αk(XNk+1,Σ
∗
u) that
are controllably-attractable to XNk+1. The iteration continues if X
N
k+1 6= XNk and otherwise
it terminates yielding the nonfaulty states X˜N of a desired optimal fault-tolerant subplant.
Further from Algorithm 1, the plant G˜ := ΥG¯(X˜
N ) is the minimal fault-tolerant subplant of
G¯ with nonfaulty states X˜N .
Remark 6 It can be verified that the number of iterations of the steps “uncontrollable/blocking
states removal” as well as “optimal fault-tolerant subplant computation” is bounded by the
number of states in G, and each such iteration has a complexity that is linear in the size of
plant G. It follows that the complexity of Algorithm 2 is quadratic in the size of plant G.
The following theorem establishes the correctness of Algorithm 2.
Theorem 14 Given overall plant G, nonfaulty plant GN and specification (Xg, Xgm), Algo-
rithm 2 computes (G˜N , G˜) with G˜N = supFNG (G
N ) and G˜ ∈ MINFG˜N (G).
Proof: We first prove that G˜N is the supremal element of FNG (G
N ). First note that the
“uncontrollable/nonblocking removal step” computes the supremal subplant (G¯, G¯N ) that is
safe (does not reach an illegal state), controllable (is invariant with respect to the execution of
feasible uncontrollable transitions), and nonblocking (a legal final state can always be reached
within G¯). Thus if (G¯, G¯N ) also happens to be fault-tolerant, then G¯N will be the supremal
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element of FNG (G
N ), and otherwise the supremal element of FNG (G
N ) must be a subplant of
G¯N . The “optimal fault-tolerant subplant computation” step iteratively computes the state set
of such a subplant. The iteration starts with X¯N of G¯N and iteratively removes states to obtain
X˜N . It is clear from the “optimal fault-tolerant computation” step that the uncontrollable
reach of X˜N is controllably-attractable to X˜N and so for G˜N exists G′ = G¯|Ωc
G¯
(X˜N ) such
that (G′, G˜N ) is fault-tolerant. Further since illegal states are not reached in G¯, they are
also not reached in G′. Next since the uncontrollable transitions of X˜N reach states that
are controllably-attractable to X˜N , we can conclude that G′ is invariant with respect to the
execution of feasible uncontrollable transitions, i.e., it is controllable. Also since the states in
X˜N can always reach the states in X˜N ∩Xgm without having to leave the states of G′, X˜N is
nonblocking with respect to X˜N ∩Xgm. Then owing to the fault-tolerance property the states
of G′ are also nonblocking with respect to X˜N ∩ Xgm. Thus (G′, G˜N ) is safe, controllable,
nonblocking, and fault-tolerant. The supremality of X˜N follows from the fact that any state
in X¯N − X˜N that gets removed in the “optimal fault-tolerant subplant computation” violates
either the fault-tolerance or the nonblocking property, and so cannot be present in the supremal
solution.
Next since G′ is a subplant of G¯, ΥG′(X˜N ) = ΥG¯(X˜N ). It follows that, G˜ = ΥG′(X˜N ) =
ΥG¯(X˜
N ) is the minimal subplant of G′ with the nonfaulty states X˜N . It follows that G˜ ∈
MINFG˜N (G).
Example 5 The following example illustrates the Algorithm 2. Consider the plant (G,GN )
given in Figure 4.6. Encircled states denote the final states. There is a single illegal state labeled
dump; the remaining states form the state set Xg. The specification for the marked states is
given as Xgm = X
g ∩Xm = Xm. The dotted double arrowed transitions are uncontrollable and
the remaining ones are controllable. All transitions from a state in XN to a state in X are
considered faulty (and also uncontrollable). Note each transition has a distinct event label and
so it can be identified by the event labeling the transition.
The subplant (G0, GN0 ) obtained after the removal of uncontrollable and blocking states is
shown in Figure 4.7. Note the states 4 and 8 get removed since they can reach the illegal state
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Figure 4.6 Plant (G,GN )
uncontrollably. Also note that XN0 = {1, 2, 3}, and X0 = {1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11}.
Figure 4.7 Controllable and nonblocking subplant (G0, GN0 )
Since x0 = {2} ∈ X0, the computation of the fault-tolerant subplant proceeds as follows.
1. Iteration no. 1:
• XN1 = {1, 2, 3};
• ΩcG0(XN1 ) = {1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 10, 11},
∆G0(X
N
1 ) = {c8, c12, c14, u7};
• X1 = {1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 10, 11}. The resulting (G1, GN1 ) is shown in Figure 4.8.
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Figure 4.8 (G1, GN1 ) obtained after iteration no. 1
2. Iteration no. 2:
• XN2 = {2, 3};
• ΩcG1(XN2 ) = {2, 3, 6, 7, 10, 11},
∆G1(X
N
2 ) = {c8, c12, c14, u7};
• X2 = {2, 3, 6, 7, 10, 11}. The resulting (G2, GN2 ) is shown in Figure 4.9.
Figure 4.9 (G2, GN2 ) obtained after iteration no. 2
3. Iteration no. 3:
• XN3 = {2, 3}. Since X3 = X2, the iteration stops.
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After removing the controllable transitions {c2, c9} that leave the state set X2 and also
all controllable transitions in the faulty part of G2 that are not included in ∆G2(X
N
3 ) =
{c8, c12, c14, u7}, we get the desired fault-tolerant subplant shown in Figure 4.10.
Figure 4.10 Optimal fault-tolerant subplant
We can see that state 2 and 3 are the only nonfaulty states from where after the occurrence
of a fault it is possible to recover within a bounded delay. State 1 does not have this property
since it is possible to uncontrollably reach state 5 from where a bounded delay recovery is not
possible (state 5 is contained in a cycle of uncontrollable transitions). On the other hand state
4 does not have this property since it is possible to uncontrollably reach the illegal state from
state 4. It can be seen then that the computed nonfaulty part is supremal. The faulty states 6,
7, and 10 must be present in the overall subplant since those states are uncontrollably reached
from the nonfaulty states 2 and 3. Since the only way to recover from the faulty state 10
is through state 11, state 11 must also be included in the overall subplant. Finally removing
any controllable transition in the faulty part renders the overall subplant “fault-intolerant”. It
follows that the computed faulty part is minimal.
4.5 Optimality of Recovery Delay
The algorithm we proposed above computes an optimal fault-tolerant supervisor with the
properties that it
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• maximizes the achievable nonfaulty behavior,
• minimizes the achievable faulty behavior,
• ensures safety and nonblockingness, and
• ensures bounded-delay recovery.
In this section we show that the synthesized optimal fault-tolerant supervisor has the
following additional property that it
• minimizes the recovery-delay.
In the following we formally define the recovery-delay of a state, which is the maximum
over the length of the paths starting from the said state and ending at the first nonfaulty state.
Definition 11 Given a plant pair (G,GN ) and a state x ∈ X, the recovery-delay of x,
ρ(x, (G,GN )), is defined as: ρ(x, (G,GN )) := max{|s| | α(x, s) ∈ XN ,∀t < s : α(x, t) 6∈ XN}.
For a nonfaulty state x ∈ XN , we let ρ(x, (G,GN )) = 0, and for a faulty state x ∈ X−XN
that is not attractable to the nonfaulty part, we let ρ(x, (G,GN )) =∞.
Letting G˜N := supFNG (G
N ) and G˜ ∈ MINFG˜N (G) with state set (X˜N , X˜), in the following
we prove that given any fault-tolerant subplant pair (G′, G′N ) of (G,GN ), for any state x ∈
X˜ − X˜N , ρ(x, (G′, G′N )) ≥ ρ(x, (G˜N , G˜)). First, we prove in the following lemma that the
recovery-delay of a faulty state equals to the order at which it is added to the region of
controllable attraction.
Lemma 1 Consider a plant pair (G,GN ), an optimal fault-tolerant subplant (G˜, G˜N ), and a
faulty state x ∈ X − XN . ∀k ≥ 1, x ∈ Ωk − Ωk−1 if and only if ρ(x, (G˜, G˜N )) = k, where
Ωk is the states included in the k-th iteration of the computation of the region of controllable
attraction ΩcG(X˜
N ) (see Algorithm 1).
Proof: We prove by induction on k. For the base step, k = 1. For the forward implication,
suppose, x ∈ Ω1 − Ω0 = Ω1 − X˜N . Then by definition, α˜(x,Σ) ⊆ X˜N , and so it follows that
ρ(x, (G˜, G˜N )) = 1. On the other hand for the backward implication suppose ρ(x, (G˜, G˜N )) = 1.
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This implies the longest path from x to X˜N in G˜ is of length 1, implying that α˜(x,Σ) ⊆ X˜N ,
which in turn implies that x ∈ Ω1. Further since x is faulty, it follows that x ∈ Ω1 − XN ⊆
Ω1 − X˜N = Ω1 − Ω0.
For the inductive step, suppose ρ(x, (G˜, G˜N )) = n if and only if x ∈ Ωn−Ωn−1, and consider
the case when k = n+1. For the forward implication, since x ∈ Ωn+1−Ωn, then by definition,
α˜(x,Σ) ⊆ Ωn and there exists σ ∈ Σ such that α˜(x, σ) ∈ Ωn−Ωn−1. Therefore, ρ(x, (G˜, G˜N )) =
1 + ρ(α˜(x, σ), (G˜, G˜N )) = 1 + n. On the other hand, for the backward implication, suppose
ρ(x, (G˜, G˜N )) = 1+n. This implies that there exists σ ∈ Σ such that ρ(α˜(x, σ), (G˜, G˜N )) = n.
From induction hypothesis, α˜(x, σ) ∈ Ωn − Ωn−1. Since x ∈ ΩcG(X˜N ), the fact that α˜(x, σ) ∈
Ωn − Ωn−1 implies x ∈ Ωn+1. On the other hand since ρ(x, (G˜, G˜N )) = 1 + n 6= n, it follows
from induction hypothesis that x 6∈ Ωn. Therefore, x ∈ Ωn+1−Ωn. This completes the proof.
Above lemma states that when a state is added in the region of controllable attraction in
the k-th step, the recovery-delay for this state in an optimal fault-tolerant control plant is k,
and vise versa. To establish the minimality of the recovery-delay, the following theorem shows
that any other controller has a larger recovery-delay.
Theorem 15 Consider a plant pair (G,GN ), an optimal fault-tolerant subplant (G˜, G˜N ), a
fault-tolerant subplant (G′, G′N ) with X ′N = X˜N , and a faulty state x ∈ X˜ − X˜N . Then
ρ(x, (G′, G′N ) ≥ ρ(x, (G˜, G˜N )).
Proof:
First note that if x 6∈ X ′, then ρ(x′, (G′, G′N )) = ∞ > ρ(x, (G˜, G˜N )). So it suffices to
consider x ∈ X ′. Then since x ∈ X˜− X˜N , x ∈ X ′− X˜N = X ′−X ′N . Suppose ρ(x, (G˜, G˜N )) =
k ≥ 1. Then from Lemma 1, x ∈ Ωk−Ωk−1, where Ωk is as defined in the statement of Lemma
1.
Suppose for contradiction that ρ(x, (G′, G′N )) < k. Then following the computation of
ΩcG(X˜
N ) as given in Algorithm 1, it must be the case that x ∈ Ωj with j < k. This is a
contradiction to the fact that x ∈ Ωk − Ωk−1.
80
4.6 Application Example
In this section, we provide an application example consisting of a simplified cooling-water
system for gas turbine, shown in Figure 4.11.
P1
compressor turbine
fuel
V2 V1
P2
Combustion
chamber
P3
P-17
Figure 4.11 A simplified cooling water system for gas turbine
In Figure 4.11, there are three cooling-water pumps (P1, P2, and P3), two fuel gas control
valves (V1 and V2), a compressor, a gas chamber, and a turbine. The fuel gas valves control
the fuel to the combustion chamber: higher the fuel supply, higher the turbine spinning speed,
and higher the combustion chamber temperature. V1 is the valve that operates under normal
conditions, whereas V2 is the emergency valve that operates when V1 is stuck. The cooling-
water is used to cool down the lubrication oil that lubricates the blade and shaft in the
combustion chamber. For simplicity, we suppose that the cooling-water is directly supplied
to the combustion chamber. Among the three pumps, P1 is the one that operates under the
normal conditions, and is called the leading pump. P2 is a standby pump, called the lagging
pump, and P3 is the emergency pump which is used when an emergency action is needed.
When the system is idling, the pumps are off and valves are closed. When the system is
turned on, emergency valve V2 is kept fully open, whereas valve V1 is controlled by a computer.
When the turbine is working, pump P1 circulates the cooling-water to take away the excess
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heat from the combustion. Under normal situation, P1 is adequate enough to keep the com-
bustion chamber temperature in an acceptable range. When more fuel is injected, the chamber
temperature increases. When a certain temperature limit T1 is surpassed, P2 is turned on to
bring the chamber temperature to normal. If the temperature continues to rise and surpasses
a higher limit T2, emergency pump P3 is turned on to further help cool down the chamber.
In our example, P2 and P3 together are assumed powerful enough to lower the temperature in
any situation provided they are turned on in a timely fashion.
In this example, the fuel control valve V1 or the compressor may incur fault. The valve may
get stuck open (so when less fuel is needed, a lot more is still sent to the combustion chamber).
Compressor may fault to supply air at a higher pressure, causing generation of excessive heat
in the combustion process. In this case the chamber temperature exceeds T1, and the correct
action after the occurrence of this fault is to turn on the lag pump P2. If the temperature
continues to rise, another temperature fault, which is the violation of limit T2, may occur. In
this case, the emergency pump P3 is also turned on. When both P2 and P3 are running, special
actions are taken to prevent the deterioration of the situation. Such special actions include
the control of the emergency valve V2 to limit the fuel, and the lowering of the air pressure
of the compressor to limit the air flow to the combustion chamber. These emergency actions
are canceled only when the temperature returns below T1. During the time the temperature is
rising, if both pumps are not turned on within a certain time, say t˜, the system may fail when
a certain temperature limit T3 is surpassed.
So, in this application, the two uncontrollable faulty events are the two temperature faults:
f1 Temperature limit T1 is violated
f2 Temperature limit T2 is violated
Also, there are two other uncontrollable events, corresponding to the decrease of the tem-
perature due to the starting of the pumps:
d1 Temperature decreases below T1
d2 Temperature decreases below T2
The feasible controllable events are:
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p2 Switch-on pump P2
p2 Switch-off pump P2
p3 Switch-on pump P3
p3 Switch-off pump P3
t2 Switch-on pump P2 in t˜ time
t3 Switch-on pump P3 in t˜ time
t Switch-on pump P2 or P3 after t˜ time
The statesX are abstracted to represent the values of the 5 binary state variables, s1, . . . , s5,
the meanings of which are listed as follows:
Variable Meaning 1 0
s1 Pump P2 is on? yes no
s2 Pump P3 is on? yes no
s3 Temperature is over T1? yes no
s4 Temperature is over T2? yes no
s5 Temperature is over T3? yes no
Note since pump P1 remains on when the system is running, it’s not necessary to track the
state of P1.
The states −− 000 (− represents 1 or 0) are the normal states XN . Since when s4 is 1, s3
is also 1, there is no states of the form − − 01−. When s5 is 1, the system fails, and so such
states are called failed states, and are represented as the same state denoted F .
The abstracted model of the cooling-water system is shown in Figure 4.12. In Figure 4.12,
there are 12 “non-failed” states and one failed state. The initial state is also the final state,
which is shown as the double-circle state. All solid edges represent controllable events and all
dashed edges represent uncontrollable events. The dashed edges with double arrows are faulty
events. All events are observable.
As shown in Figure 4.12, the overall plant model G has 13 states. and the nonfaulty part
GN consists of the states where no fault has occurred, i.e., the states with label (−−000). The
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Figure 4.12 Model of cooling-water system of Figure 4.11
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specification for the overall plant excludes all traces that reach the failed state, i.e., the failed
state is deem forbidden for the overall plant. State 00000 is the initial and the final state, and
the specification KN for the nonfaulty plant excludes all traces of GN that end at a non-final
state.
In the following we apply Algorithm 2 to compute the optimal fault-tolerant subplant. The
computation is accomplished in two steps. The result after the “Uncontrollable/blocking states
removal” step is shown in Figure 4.13. In this step, only the failed state is removed, since all
the transitions that reach the failed state are controllable.
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Figure 4.13 The controllable and nonblocking subplant of (G,GN )
For the ”optimal fault-tolerant subplant computation” step, we use Algorithm 1 to compute
the region of controllable attraction of the nonfaulty states, as well as the optimal fault-tolerant
subplant. Note that in this example all faulty states are controllably attractable except the
failed state. Such attractable states get added into the region of controllable attraction in five
iterations. During this computation, we also obtain the minimal set of transitions required for
achieving controllable attractability, ∆G(XN ) = {(11100, d1, 11000), (11110, d2, 11100),
(10110, t3, 11110), (01110, t2, 11110), (10100, f2, 10110), (01100, f2, 01110), (00110, t2, 10110),
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(00100, f2, 00110), (10100, d1, 10000), (01100, d1, 01000)}. It turns out that every state in the
region of controllable attraction of the nonfaulty states is reachable from a nonfaulty state
by executing a sequence of uncontrollable transitions, followed by a sequence of transitions
belonging to the minimal set of transitions required for controllable attraction. Thus the
minimal fault-tolerant subplant includes all states of the region of controllable attraction of
the nonfaulty states, and the ”optimal fault-tolerant subplant computation” terminates in one
iteration. The resulting optimal fault-tolerant subplant is shown in Figure 4.14.
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Figure 4.14 The optimal fault-tolerant subplant ΥG(XN )
In Figure 4.14, it is clear that all faulty states are able to recover within a bounded delay.
It can be seen that the nonfaulty part is supremal, since no nonfaulty state or transition of
the nonfaulty part is removed, whereas the faulty part is minimal, since if any state or any
transition in the faulty part is removed, the plant will no longer remain fault-tolerant. Finally
it can be seen that safety and nonblockingness are also satisfied.
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4.7 Conclusion
A notion of fault-tolerant supervisory control was introduced in our prior work [Wen, Q.
and Kumar, R. and Huang, J. and Liu, H. (2007a)], [Wen, Q. and Kumar, R. and Huang,
J. and Liu, H. (2007b)], [Wen, Q. and Kumar, R. and Huang, J. and Liu, H. (2008)] where
the controlled system must not only satisfy the desired safety and progress properties but must
also be fault-tolerant, i.e., following the occurrence of any fault a recovery to a nonfaulty or
nonfaulty-equivalent state must occur within a bounded delay. Here we formulated the notion
of an optimal fault-tolerant supervisor to be one that maximizes the nonfaulty behavior and at
the same time minimizes the faulty behavior that must be tolerated, and also ensures safety,
nonblockingness, and bounded-delay recovery. We showed that while the problem in general
does not admit an optimal solution, an optimal solution does exist over the class of state-
feedback control policies. We presented an algorithm to find such an optimal solution. The
complexity of the algorithm is quadratic in the size of a given plant. The optimal fault-tolerant
supervisor is also shown to minimize the recovery-delay for any faulty state.
87
CHAPTER 5. Decentralized Diagnosis of Event-Driven Systems for Safely
Reacting to Failures
For the fault-tolerant control framework that we presented in earlier chapters, the diagnosis
of a failure that may have occurred is not explicitly required. In this chapter we present a
method for the explicit diagnosis of a failure after it occurs. The failure must be diagnosed
prior to any safety specification is violated so that a recovery action can be taken.
In this chapter, we introduce the notion of safe-codiagnosability, extending the notion of
safe-diagnosability [Paoli, A. and Lafortune, S. (2005)] to the decentralized setting, where
there exist multiple diagnosers performing diagnosis using their own observations without
communicating to each other. For a system, a certain sub-behavior is deemed safe (captured
via a safety specification), and a further sub-behavior is deemed non-faulty (captured via a non-
fault specification). Safe-codiagnosability requires that when the system executes a trace that
is faulty, there exists at least one diagnoser that can detect this within bounded delay and also
before the safety specification is violated. The above notion of safe-codiagnosability may also
be viewed as an extension of the notion of codiagnosability [Qiu, W. and Kumar, R. (2004)],
where the latter did not have any safety requirement. We show that safe-codiagnosability is
equivalent to codiagnosability together with “zero-delay codiagnosability” of “boundary safe
traces”. (A safe trace is a boundary safe trace, if exists a single-event extension that is unsafe.)
We give an algorithm of polynomial complexity for verifying safe-codiagnosability. For a safe-
codiagnosable system, the same methods as those proposed in [Qiu, W. and Kumar, R. (2004)]
can be applied for off-line synthesis of individual diagnosers, as well as for on-line diagnosis
using them.
0This research was a cooperative achievement with Wenbin Qiu (ISU 2006 graduate).
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5.1 Introduction
Failure diagnosis is an active area of research, and has received considerable attention
in the literature. A failure is a deviation from an expected or desired behavior. Various
approaches have been proposed for failure diagnosis, including fault-trees, expert systems,
neural networks, fuzzy logic, Bayesian networks, and analytical redundancy [Pouliezos, A. D.
and Stavrakakis, G. S. (1994)]. These are broadly categorized into non-model based (where
observed behavior is matched to known failures), and model based (where observed behavior
is compared against model predictions for any abnormality).
For discrete event systems (DESs) – systems with discrete states that change when certain
events occur, a certain model based approach for failure diagnosis is proposed in [Sampath,
M. and Sengupta, R. and Lafortune, S. and Sinaamohideen, K. and Teneketzis, D. (1995)].
The property of diagnosability requires that once a failure has occurred, it be detected and
diagnosed within bounded “delay” (within bounded number of transitions). The diagnosability
can be tested polynomially as shown later in [Jiang, S. and Huang, Z. and Chandra, V. and
Kumar, R. (2001)], [Yoo, T. S. and Lafortune, S. (2002)]. In [Sampath, M. and Lafortune,
S. (1998)], the notion of active failure diagnosis was introduced where control is exercised
to meet given specifications while satisfying diagnosability. In [Das, S. R. and Holloway,
L. E. (2000)], [Pandalai, D. and Holloway, L. (2000)], a template based approach was
developed for failure diagnosis in timed discrete event system. The above approaches can be
thought to be “event-based” as failure is modeled as execution of certain “faulty events”. An
equivalent “state-based” approach was considered in [Lin, F. (1994)], [Zad, S. H. and Kwong,
R. H. and Wonham, W. M. (2003)], where the occurrence of a failure is modeled as reaching
of certain “faulty states”. To facilitate generalization of failure specifications, linear-time
temporal logic (LTL) based specification and diagnosis of its failure was proposed in [Jiang, S.
and Kumar, R. (2004)]. A theory for failure diagnosis of repeatedly-occurring/intermittent
failures was introduced in [Jiang, S. and Kumar, R. and Garcia, H. E. (2003)].
The above mentioned work dealt with centralized failure diagnosis, where a central di-
agnoser is responsible for failure detection and diagnosis in the system. [Debouk, R. and
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Lafortune, S. and Teneketzis, D. (2000)] addressed the problem of distributed failure di-
agnosis based on a “coordinated decentralized architecture”, where local diagnosers do not
communicate with each other directly, but send local information to a coordinator. Then the
coordinator makes the final diagnosis decision. [Sengupta, R. and Tripakis, S. (2002)] dis-
cussed the distributed diagnosis problem, where communication directly exists between local
diagnosers, and is assumed to be lossless, and in order. Notion of “decentralized diagnosis” was
formulated, which was proved to be undecidable. The decentralized diagnosis problem with
asymmetric communication was discussed in [Boel, R. K. and van Schuppen, J. H. (2002)],
where communication is one-way and without delays. In a prior work [Qiu, W. and Kumar,
R. (2004)], we studied the problem of decentralized failure diagnosis, where the system fail-
ure is diagnosed by multiple local diagnosers. A notion of codiagnosability was introduced to
capture the fact that the occurrence of any failure must be diagnosed within bounded delay
by at least one local diagnoser using its own observations of the system execution. Polynomial
algorithms were provided for (i) testing codiagnosability, (ii) computing the delay bound of
diagnosis, (iii) off-line synthesis of diagnosers, and (iv) on-line diagnosis using them.
In order to react to a failure in a timely fashion, while it is necessary that the failure be
detected within a bounded delay, such a property alone is not sufficient. It is also needed that
the detection occur before the system behavior becomes “unsafe”. To capture this additional
requirement for failure detection, the notion of safe-diagnosability was introduced in [Paoli,
A. and Lafortune, S. (2005)]. We extend this notion to the decentralized setting, where
there exist multiple diagnosers performing diagnosis using their own observations without
communicating to each other, by formulating the notion of safe-codiagnosability. For a system,
a certain sub-behavior is deemed safe (captured via a safety specification), and a further sub-
behavior is deemed non-faulty (captured via a non-fault specification). The safe behavior
includes all of non-faulty behavior and some of post-fault behavior where system performance
may be degraded but still tolerable. Safe-codiagnosability requires that when the system
executes a trace that is faulty, then exists at least one diagnoser that can detect this within
bounded delay and also before the safety specification is violated. The above notion of safe-
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codiagnosability may also be viewed as an extension of the notion of codiagnosability [Qiu,
W. and Kumar, R. (2004)], where the latter did not have any safety requirement. We
show that safe-codiagnosability is equivalent to codiagnosability together with “zero-delay
codiagnosability” of “boundary safe traces”. (A safe trace is a boundary safe trace, if exists
a single-event extension that is unsafe.) We give an algorithms of polynomial complexity
for verifying safe-codiagnosability. (The verification algorithm presented in [Paoli, A. and
Lafortune, S. (2005)] was based upon the structural property of a deterministic diagnoser,
and had an exponential complexity owing to the exponential size of the diagnoser.) For a
safe-codiagnosable system, the same methods as those proposed in [Qiu, W. and Kumar,
R. (2004)] can be applied for off-line synthesis of individual diagnosers, as well as for on-line
diagnosis using them.
5.2 Notions and Preliminaries
Given an event set Σ, Σ∗ is used to denote the set of all finite length event sequences
over Σ, including the zero length event sequence ². A member of Σ∗ is a trace and a subset of
Σ∗ is a language. Given a languageK ⊆ Σ∗, the complement of K, denoted Kc ⊆ Σ∗, is defined
as Kc := Σ∗ − K. If trace t is a prefix of trace s, it is denoted as t ≤ s. Given a language
K ⊆ Σ∗, its prefix-closure, denoted pr(K), is defined as, pr(K) := {s ∈ Σ∗|∃t ∈ K s.t. s ≤ t},
and K is said to be prefix-closed if K = pr(K). The supremal prefix-closed sublanguage of
K, denoted supP (K) ⊆ K, is defined as, supP (K) := {s ∈ K|pr(s) ⊆ K}. The quotient of
K1 with respect to K2 is defined as K1/K2 := {s ∈ Σ∗|∃t ∈ K2 s.t. st ∈ K1}. The set of
deadlocking traces of a language K are those traces from which no further extensions exist in
K, i.e., s ∈ K is deadlocking trace if {s}Σ∗ ∩K = {s}.
A DES is modeled as a finite state machine (FSM)/finite automaton (FA) G and is denoted
by G(X,Σ, α, x0), where X is the set of states, Σ is the finite set of events, x0 ∈ X is the
initial state, and α : X × Σ¯ → 2X is the transition function, where Σ¯ := Σ ∪ {²}. G is said
to be deterministic if |α(·, ·)| ≤ 1 and |α(·, ²)| = 0; otherwise, it is called nondeterministic.
(x, σ, x′) ∈ X × Σ¯×X is a transition of G if x′ ∈ α(x, σ); it is an ²-transition if σ = ². Letting
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²∗(x) denote the set of states reachable from x in zero or more ²-transitions, the transition
function α can be extended from domain X × Σ¯ to domain X × Σ∗ recursively as follows:
∀x ∈ X, s ∈ Σ∗, σ ∈ Σ, α(x, ²) = ²∗(x), and α(x, sσ) = ²∗(α(α(x, s), σ))). The generated
language by G is defined as L(G) := {s ∈ Σ∗|α(x0, s) 6= ∅}, i.e., it includes all traces that can be
executed from the initial state of G. States reached by execution of deadlocking traces in L(G)
are called deadlocking states. A path in G is a sequence of transitions (x1, σ1, x2, · · · , σn−1, xn),
where σi ∈ Σ¯ and xi+1 ∈ α(xi, σi) for all i ∈ {1, · · · , n−1}. The path is called a cycle if x1 = xn.
Given an automaton G = {X,Σ, α, x0}, the complete model of G is defined as G¯ =
{X¯,Σ, α¯, x0}, where X¯ := X ∪ {F}, and α¯ is defined as follows.
∀x¯ ∈ X¯, σ ∈ Σ, α¯(x¯, σ) :=

α(x¯, σ), if [x¯ ∈ X] ∧ [α(x¯, σ) 6= ∅]
F, if [x¯ = F ] ∨ [α(x¯, σ) = ∅]
.
Since all events are defined at each state, the complete model G¯ generates the language Σ∗,
i.e., L(G¯) = Σ∗.
Given two automata G = (X,Σ, α, x0) and R = (Y,Σ, β, y0), the synchronous composition
of G and R is defined as, G||R = (X × Y,Σ, γ, (x0, y0)) such that
∀(x, y) ∈ X × Y, σ ∈ Σ¯, γ((x, y), σ) :=

α(x, σ)× β(y, σ), if σ 6= ²;
(α(x, ²)× {y}) ∪ ({x} × β(y, ²)), otherwise.
If the system execution is observed through a single global observer, we can define a global
observation mask as M : Σ¯ → ∆¯ with M(²) = ², where ∆¯ := ∆ ∪ {²} and ∆ is the set
of observed symbols. The definition of M can be extended from events to event sequences
inductively as follows:
M(²) = ²; ∀s ∈ Σ∗, σ ∈ Σ,M(sσ) =M(s)M(σ).
Given an automaton G and maskM ,M(G) is the masked automaton of G with each transition
(x, σ, x′) of G replaced by (x,M(σ), x′). The local observation masks associated with different
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local observers are defined as Mi : Σ¯ → ∆¯i (i ∈ I = {1, · · · ,m}), where m is the number of
local observers, ∆¯i := ∆i ∪ {²} and ∆i is the set of locally observed symbols.
5.3 Safe-Codiagnosability
In this section, we present the definition of safe-codiagnosability and the “separation
property” of safe-codiagnosability. As described in [Qiu, W. and Kumar, R. (2004)], for the
purpose of diagnosis, a system with deadlocking states can be converted to a deadlock free system
by adding a self-loop labeled ² at each of its deadlocking state without affecting the diagnosis
analysis. So without loss of generality, we assume a system to be diagnosed, a “plant”, to be
deadlock free.
Definition 12 [Qiu, W. and Kumar, R. (2004)] Let L be the prefix-closed language gener-
ated by a plant, and K be a prefix-closed sublanguage specifying the non-faulty plant behavior
(K = pr(K) ⊆ L). Assume there are m local sites with observation masks Mi : Σ¯ → ∆¯i
(i ∈ I = {1, · · · ,m}). (L,K) is said to be codiagnosable with respect to {Mi} if
(∃n ∈ N )(∀s ∈ L−K)(∀st ∈ L−K, |t| ≥ n)⇒
(∃i ∈ I)(∀u ∈M−1i Mi(st) ∩ L, u ∈ L−K) (5.1)
In the following lemma we provide an alternative definition of codiagnosability.
Lemma 2 Let L and K be prefix-closed plant and non-fault specification languages respec-
tively, and for i ∈ I, Mi be observation mask of site i. Then (L,K) is codiagnosable with
respect to {Mi} if and only if
∃n ∈ N : [(L−K)Σ≥n ∩ L] ∩
i∈I
M−1i Mi(K) = ∅.
Proof: The condition (5.1) in definition of codiagnosability requires that exists a local site i
such that any st-indistinguishable u at site i is faulty (u ∈ L−K). This can be rephrased as
saying that it is not the case that for each site i exists a st-indistinguishable non-faulty trace
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ui ∈ K, i.e.,
¬(∀i ∈ I)(∃ui ∈M−1i Mi(st) ∩ L, ui ∈ K) (5.2)
The set of traces,
{w | ∀i ∈ I, ∃ui ∈M−1i Mi(w) ∩ L, ui ∈ K}
is same as the set of traces ∩
i∈I
M−1i Mi(K). Thus the condition (5.2) can be equivalently written
as, st 6∈ ∩
i∈I
M−1i Mi(K).
Further since st ∈ L is a feasible extension of a faulty trace s ∈ L−K with length of t at
least the delay bound n, st ∈ L∩ (L−K)Σ≥n. It follows that the definition of codiagnosability
of (L,K) may be rephrased as,
∃n ∈ N : [(L−K)Σ≥n ∩ L] ∩
i∈I
M−1i Mi(K) = ∅.
Remark 7 We can introduce the notion of “zero delay codiagnosability” by setting n = 0 in
the definition of codiagnosability provided by Lemma 2. Then (L,K) is said to be zero-delay
codiagnosable with respect to {Mi} if
(L−K) ∩
i∈I
M−1i Mi(K) = ∅. (5.3)
We say a faulty sublanguage H ⊆ L −K is zero-delay codiagnosable with respect to {Mi} if
H ∩
i∈I
M−1i Mi(K) = ∅.
Note that (5.3) is equivalent to,
∩
i∈I
M−1i Mi(K) ∩ L ⊆ K,
i.e., (L,K) is zero-delay codiagnosable if and only if the non-faulty behavior K is decomposable
[Rudie, K. andWonham, W. M. (1992)] with respect to the non-faulty+faulty (plant) behavior
L.
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Definition 12 captures the system property that a failure event can be diagnosed within
bounded delay after its occurrence by at least one of the local sites. In order to react to a
failure in a timely fashion, it is also needed that a failure be detected before system behavior
becomes “unsafe”. Safe behavior includes all of non-faulty behavior and some of post-fault be-
havior where system performance may be degraded but still tolerable. The safety specification,
denoted KS , is another prefix-closed sublanguage of plant language, containing the non-fault
specification, i.e., K ⊆ KS ⊆ L. Then the notion of safe-codiagnosability can be formalized as
follows.
Definition 13 Let L be the prefix-closed language generated by a plant, and K and KS be
prefix-closed non-fault and safety specification languages contained in L, respectively (K ⊆
KS ⊆ L). Assume there are m local sites with observation masks Mi : Σ¯ → ∆¯i (i ∈ I =
{1, · · · ,m}). (L,K,KS) is said to be safe-codiagnosable with respect to {Mi} if
(∃n ∈ N )(∀s ∈ L−K)(∀st ∈ L−K, |t| ≥ n)⇒
(∃i ∈ I)(∃v ∈ pr(st) ∩KS)
(∀u ∈M−1i Mi(v) ∩ L, u ∈ L−K) (5.4)
Definition 13 has the following meaning. A system is safe-codiagnosable if there exists a
delay bound n such that for all faulty trace s ∈ L − K and all extension t of s with length
longer than delay bound (|t| ≥ n), there exists a site i and a safe prefix v of st such that for
all v-indistinguishable u at site i, u is a faulty trace in L−K. Informally, Definition 13 means
that for any faulty trace, there exists at least one local site that can unambiguously detect
that failure within bounded delay and before safety is violated.
Just as we provided an alternative definition of codiagnosability in Lemma 2, we provide
an alternative definition of safe-codiagnosability in the following lemma.
Lemma 3 Let L,K, and KS be prefix-closed plant, non-fault specification, and safety specifi-
cation languages respectively, and for i ∈ I, Mi be observation mask of site i. Then (L,K,KS)
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is safe-codiagnosable with respect to {Mi} if and only if
∃n ∈ N : [(L−K)Σ≥n ∩ L]
∩supP [ ∩
i∈I
M−1i Mi(K) ∪KcS ] = ∅.
Proof: The condition (5.4) in definition of codiagnosability requires that exists a local site i
and a safe prefix v ≤ st such that any v-indistinguishable u at site i is faulty (u ∈ L − K).
This can be rephrased as saying that it is not the case that for each site i for each safe prefix
v ≤ st exists a v-indistinguishable non-faulty trace ui ∈ K, i.e.,
¬(∀i ∈ I)(∀v ∈ pr(st) ∩KS)
(∃ui ∈M−1i Mi(v) ∩ L, ui ∈ K) (5.5)
The set of traces,
{w | ∀i ∈ I,∀v ∈ pr(w) ∩KS ,
∃ui ∈M−1i Mi(v) ∩ L, ui ∈ K}
is same as the set of traces,
{w | pr(w) ∩KS ⊆ ∩
i∈I
M−1i Mi(K)},
which is the same set of traces,
{w | pr(w) ⊆ ∩
i∈I
M−1i Mi(K) ∪KcS},
which is the set
supP [ ∩
i∈I
M−1i Mi(K) ∪KcS ],
Note that a trace w belongs to this last set if and only if pr(w) ⊆ [ ∩
i∈I
M−1i Mi(K) ∪KcS ], i.e.,
each prefix of w has the property that it is either unsafe (belongs to KcS) or for each i exists
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Mi-indistinguishable trace ui ∈ K.
Thus the condition (5.5) can be equivalently written as, st 6∈ supP [ ∩
i∈I
M−1i Mi(K) ∪KcS ].
On the other hand, based on the arguments used in the proof of Lemma 2, we know that
st ∈ L ∩ (L−K)Σ≥n. It follows that the definition of safe-codiagnosability of (L,K) may be
rephrased as,
∃n ∈ N : [(L−K)Σ≥n ∩ L]
∩supP [ ∩
i∈I
M−1i Mi(K) ∪KcS ] = ∅.
To facilitate the development of a test for safe-codiagnosability, we show that the prop-
erty of safe-codiagnosability can be separated into codiagnosability together with zero-delay
codiagnosability of set of boundary safe traces, where a boundary safe trace is a safe trace for
which exists a single-event extension that is unsafe.
Definition 14 Given prefix-closed plant language L and safety specification language KS , a
safe trace s ∈ KS is called a boundary safe trace if exists σ ∈ Σ such that sσ ∈ L −KS , i.e.,
s ∈ [(L−KS)/Σ]∩KS . The set of all boundary safe traces is called the boundary safe language,
denoted K∂S , and is given by K
∂
S = [(L−KS)/Σ] ∩KS .
We need the result of the following lemma before establishing the main “separation” result.
Lemma 4 Consider the prefix-closed non-fault specification language K and the observation
masks {Mi} (i ∈ I). Then ∩
i∈I
M−1i Mi(K) is prefix-closed.
Proof: Prefix-closure of K implies prefix-closure of M−1i Mi(K) for each i ∈ I. So the result
follows since prefix-closure is preserved under intersection.
The following theorem presents the “separation property” of safe-codiagnosability, based
on which we develop the test for safe-codiagnosability.
Theorem 16 Let L, K andKS be plant language, non-fault specification language, and safety
specification language, respectively. (L,K,KS) is safe-codiagnosable with respect to {Mi} if
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and only if
1. (L,K) codiagnosable with respect to {Mi}:
∃n ∈ N : [(L−K)Σ≥n ∩ L] ∩
i∈I
M−1i Mi(K) = ∅;
2. K∂S zero-delay codiagnosable with respect to {Mi}: K∂S ∩
i∈I
M−1i Mi(K) = ∅.
Proof: (⇐) From the property of codiagnosability exists a delay bound n such that condition
of codiagnosability is satisfied. We claim that the same delay bound works for the definition
of safe-codiagnosability. To see this, pick s ∈ L−K and t ∈ Σ∗ such that |t| ≥ n and st ∈ L.
Then st ∈ [(L−K)Σ≥n∩L]. We need to show that st 6∈ supP [ ∩
i∈I
M−1i Mi(K)∪KcS ], i.e., exists
a prefix v ≤ st such that v 6∈ ∩
i∈I
M−1i Mi(K) ∪ KcS . Since L − K = (KS − K) ∪ (L − KS),
st ∈ L−K implies either st ∈ KS −K or st ∈ L−KS .
For the first case (st ∈ KS − K), we can set v = st. Then v is a prefix of st, and
also since v = st ∈ KS , it holds that v 6∈ KcS . It remains to be shown that v = st 6∈
∩
i∈I
M−1i Mi(K), which holds from the property of codiagnosability since st ∈ [(L−K)Σ≥n∩L]
and [(L−K)Σ≥n ∩ L] ∩
i∈I
M−1i Mi(K) = ∅.
For the second case (st ∈ L−KS), suppose for contradiction that for every prefix v ≤ st,
it holds that v ∈ ∩
i∈I
M−1i Mi(K) ∪ KcS . Since st ∈ L − KS , exists a prefix w ≤ st that is a
boundary safe trace, i.e., w ∈ K∂S . From our supposition, w ∈ ∩
i∈I
M−1i Mi(K) ∪KcS . So,
w ∈ [L−KS)/Σ ∩KS ] ∩ [ ∩
i∈I
M−1i Mi(K) ∪KcS ]
= [L−KS)/Σ ∩KS ] ∩ [ ∩
i∈I
M−1i Mi(K)].
Then we arrive at a contradiction to the condition: K∂S ∩
i∈I
M−1i Mi(K) = ∅.
(⇒) From Lemma 3 we have,
∃n ∈ N : [(L−K)Σ≥n ∩ L]
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∩supP [ ∩
i∈I
M−1i Mi(K) ∪KcS ] = ∅.
This implies,
∃n ∈ N : [(L−K)Σ≥n ∩ L]
∩supP [ ∩
i∈I
M−1i Mi(K)] = ∅.
Further from Lemma 4, supP [ ∩
i∈I
M−1i Mi(K)] = ∩
i∈I
M−1i Mi(K). So we also have
∃n ∈ N : [(L−K)Σ≥n ∩ L] ∩
i∈I
M−1i Mi(K) = ∅,
establishing the codiagnosability.
Next to show the zero-delay codiagnosability of boundary safe traces, pick a boundary
safe trace w ∈ K∂S . Then exists σ ∈ Σ such that wσ ∈ L − KS , and we need to show
that w 6∈ ∩
i∈I
M−1i Mi(K). Set s = wσ ∈ L − KS ⊆ L − K, and pick t such that |t| ≥
n and st ∈ L (which is possible from our underlying assumption of plant being deadlock
free). Then st ∈ [(L − K)Σ≥n ∩ L]. From the assumption of safe-codiagnosability, st 6∈
supP [ ∩
i∈I
M−1i Mi(K)∪KcS ], which implies every prefix of st, including w 6∈ ∩
i∈I
M−1i Mi(K)∪KcS .
From this it follows that w 6∈ ∩
i∈I
M−1i Mi(K), as desired.
5.4 Verification of Safe-Codiagnosability
The algorithm for verifying safe-codiagnosability is based upon checking whether there
exists a situation that violates the conditions of safe-codiagnosability. From Theorem 16, we
know that safe-codiagnosability can be verified by checking codiagnosability of (L,K) together
with zero-delay codiagnosability of K∂S , the set of boundary safe traces.
Algorithm 3 Consider the finite state machine models, G = (X,Σ, α, x0), R = (Y,Σ, β, y0),
and RS = (YS ,Σ, βS , yS0 ), respectively, of the plant, the non-fault specification, and the safety
specification. The corresponding plant, non-fault specification, and safety specification lan-
guages are L = L(G),K = L(R), and KS = L(RS), respectively, where K ⊆ KS ⊆ L. Let
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Mi be the observation mask of site i (i ∈ I). To check the safe-codiagnosability of (L,K,KS),
perform the following steps:
Step 1: Check the codiagnosability of (L,K)
Construct a testing automaton
T = (G‖R¯)×R×R
for verifying the codiagnosability of (L,K). This automaton is defined as T = (Z,ΣT , γ, z0),
where
• Z = (X × Y¯ )× Y × Y .
• ΣT = Σ¯3, where Σ¯ = Σ ∪ {²}.
• z0 = ((x0, y0), y0, y0).
• γ : Z × Σ¯3 → Z is defined as: ∀z = ((x, y), y1, y2) ∈ Z, σT = (σ, σ1, σ2) ∈ ΣT − {(², ², ²)},
γ(z, σT ) := ((α(x, σ), β¯(y, σ)), β(y1, σ1), β(y2, σ2)) if and only if
[M1(σ) =M1(σ1)] ∧ [M2(σ) =M2(σ2)]
∧[(α(x, σ) 6= ∅) ∨ (β(y, σ) 6= ∅) ∨ (β(y1, σ1) 6= ∅) ∨ (β(y2, σ2) 6= ∅)]
Note that the silent-transition ² is defined at each state of any automaton as a self loop by
default. The testing automaton T is used to track if exists a triplet of traces s, u1 and u2 such
that ui is a s-indistinguishable non-fault trace under mask Mi (i ∈ {1, 2}).
Then check if exists an “offending cycle” clT = (zk, σkT , z
k+1, · · · , zl, σlT , zk) such that
∃i ∈ [k, l] s.t. (y¯i = F ) ∧ (σi 6= ²), (5.6)
where zi = ((xi, y¯i), yi1, y
i
2) ∈ Z, and σiT = (σi, σi1, σi2) ∈ ΣT . If the answer is yes, then (L,K)
is not codiagnosable, and (L,K,KS) is not safe-codiagnosable as well. Otherwise, go to the
next step.
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Step 2: Compute the set of “boundary safe states” B in G‖RS
Construct the composition G‖RS , and define the set of boundary safe states as, B :=
{(x, yS) ∈ X × YS |∃σ ∈ Σ : α(x, σ) 6= ∅, βS(yS , σ) = ∅}. Note that if s ∈ L(G‖RS) =
L(G)∩L(RS) = L∩KS = KS is such that execution of s results in reaching a state (x, yS) ∈ B,
then exists σ ∈ Σ such that sσ ∈ L−KS , i.e., s ∈ (L−KS)/Σ. It follows that s ∈ K∂S .
Step 3: Check the zero-delay codiagnosability of K∂S with respect to {Mi}
Construct a testing automaton
TS = (G‖RS)×R×R
for verifying the zero-delay codiagnosability of K∂S , where TS is obtained by replacing R¯ by RS
in the testing automaton T constructed above. Let TS = (ZS ,ΣT , γS , z
S
0 ), where ZS , γS , and
zS0 of TS are defined similarly as Z, γ, and z0 of T , respectively (with R¯ replaced by RS).
Then check if exists an “offending state” ((x, yS ), y1, y2) in TS with (x, yS ) ∈ B. K∂S is
zero-delay codiagnosable if and only if the answer is no. If K∂S is zero-delay codiagnosable,
then (L,K,KS) is safe-codiagnosable as well (since (L,K) was determined to be codiagnosable
above). Otherwise, (L,K,KS) is not safe-codiagnosable.
Since the correctness of the test for checking codiagnosability was established in [(Qiu, W.
and Kumar, R. , 2004, Theorem 1)], in the following theorem we show the correctness of the
test for checking zero-delay codiagnosability of K∂S .
Theorem 17 K∂S is not zero-delay codiagnosable with respect to {Mi} if and only if there
exists a state zS = ((x, yS ), y1, y2) in the testing automaton TS with (x, yS ) ∈ B.
Proof: (⇐) If there is a state ((x, yS ), y1, y2) in TS such that (x, yS ) ∈ B, then exist traces
s ∈ L(G‖RS), ui ∈ L(R) = K such that (i) s ∈ K∂S = (L − KS)/Σ ∩ KS , and (ii) Mi(s) =
Mi(ui). This implies that s ∈ K∂S ∩
i∈I
M−1i Mi(K), i.e., K
∂
S ∩
i∈I
M−1i Mi(K) 6= ∅. Thus, K∂S is
not zero-delay codiagnosable with respect to {Mi}.
(⇒) If K∂S is not zero-delay codiagnosable with respect to {Mi}, then exists a boundary
safe trace s ∈ K∂S such that s ∈ ∩
i∈I
M−1i Mi(K), which implies that for i = 1, 2, there exist
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ui ∈ K such that Mi(ui) = Mi(s). Then execution of the trace triple (s, u1, u2) in TS results
in a state ((x, yS ), y1, y2). Since s ∈ K∂S , (x, yS ) ∈ B, proving the assertion.
From Lemma 17 and [Qiu, W. and Kumar, R. (2004)], we get the following corollary
showing the correctness of Algorithm 3.
Corollary 5 Let G = (X,Σ, α, x0), R = (Y,Σ, β, y0) and RS = (YS ,Σ, βS , yS0 ) be the plant,
non-fault specification and safety specification models, respectively, with [K = L(R)] ⊆ [KS =
L(RS)] ⊆ [L = L(G)]. Let Mi be the observation mask of site i (i ∈ I). (L,K,KS) is not
safe-codiagnosable with respect to {Mi} if and only if one of the following conditions holds:
1. There exists an “offending” cycle
clT = (zk, σkT , z
k+1, · · · , zl, σlT , zk)
as defined in (5.6) in the testing automaton T ;
2. There exists a “offending” state zS = ((x, yS ), y1, y2) in the testing automaton TS with
(x, yS ) ∈ B.
Remark 8 Let |X|, |Y | and |YS | be the number of states in plant G, non-fault specification
R, and safety specification RS respectively, and |Σ| be the number of events. L = L(G),K =
L(R),KS = L(RS). Assume there are m local sites. It was shown in [Qiu, W. and Kumar,
R. (2004)] that the complexity for constructing the testing automaton T and checking codi-
agnosability of (L,K) is O(|X| × |Y |m+1 × |Σ|m+1). Using a similar analysis, we can verify
that the complexity for constructing the testing automaton TS and checking the zero-delay
codiagnosability of K∂S is O(|X| × |YS | × |Y |m × |Σ|m+1). It follows that overall complexity of
checking safe-codiagnosability of (L,K,KS) is, O(|X| × (|Y |+ |YS |)× |Y |m × |Σ|m+1).
Remark 9 In Algorithm 3, we use two testing automata T and TS to verify safe-codiagnosability
of (L,K,KS). These two testing automata can be combined into a testing automaton T ′ =
(G‖RS‖R¯)×R×R by replacing R¯ by RS‖R¯ in T . Then, (L,K,KS) is not safe-codiagnosable
if and only if there exists an “offending cycle” containing a state with the third coordinate
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labeled by “F”, or exists an “offending state” with its first pair of coordinates contained in B.
However, in this case, the complexity is O(|X| × |YS | × |Y |m+1 × |Σ|m+1), which is an order
higher. Thus the “separation” result obtained in Theorem 16 provides an order reduction in
the complexity of testing safe-codiagnosability.
Once a system is deemed safe-codiagnosable, the same methods as those presented in [Qiu,
W. and Kumar, R. (2004)] can be applied for the synthesis of local diagnosers as well as for
on-line diagnosis using them. This is because a diagnoser simply observes the plant behavior
and reports a fault when it becomes certain about it. The property of safe-codiagnosability
guarantees that at least one diagnoser become certain within bounded delay of the occurrence
of a fault and prior to the system behavior becoming unsafe. Details are omitted here.
The following example illustrates how to verify the safe-codiagnosability using Algorithm
3.
Example 6 Figure 5.1 (a), (b) and (c) show a plant model G, a non-fault specification model
R, and a safety specification model RS . The set of events is given by Σ = {a, b, f}. There are
two local sites, with their observation masks given as follows:
• M1(a) = a,M1(b) =M1(f) = ²;
• M1(b) = b,M2(a) =M2(f) = ².
It can be verified that (L(G), L(R)) is codiagnosable with respect to {Mi} by constructing a
testing automaton T = (G‖R¯)×R×R, which is omitted here.
Since L = L(G) = pr(ab∗ + faab∗) and KS1 = pr(ab∗ + fa), the boundary safe language
K∂B1 = [(L−KS1)/Σ] ∩KS1 = {fa}. Following the trace fa, state “3” in G and state “3” in
RS1 are reached. Thus, the set of boundary safe states is given by, B1 = {(3, 3)}. Figure 5.1
(d) shows a part of the testing automaton TS1 = (G‖RS1) × R × R, where an offending state
((3, 3), 1, 1) is reached. Therefore, K∂B1 is not zero-delay codiagnosable with respect to {Mi},
and thus (L,K,KS1) is not safe-codiagnosable with respect to {Mi} as well.
Now, if we relax the safety requirement by considering a new enlarged safety specification
model RS2 as shown in Figure 5.2 (a), the system becomes safe-codiagnosable. To see this, since
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KS2 = pr(ab
∗ + faa), the boundary safe language is given by, K∂B2 = [(L−KS2)/Σ] ∩KS2 =
{faa}. Thus, the set of boundary safe states is given by, B2 = {(4, 4)}. The new testing
automaton TS2 = (G‖RS2) × R × R is shown in Figure 5.2 (b), where no offending states
(states with first pair of coordinates being (4, 4)) are reached. Therefore, K∂B2 is zero-delay
codiagnosable with respect to {Mi}, and thus (L,K,KS2) is safe-codiagnosable with respect
to {Mi} as well.
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= (G || R
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) x R x R
Figure 5.1 Models G, R and RS1, and testing automaton TS1 (right)
5.5 Conclusion
This paper studies the property of being able to react safely to failures in a decen-
tralized setting. For this purpose a notion of safe-codiagnosability is introduced by extending
the notion of safe-diagnosability [Paoli, A. and Lafortune, S. (2005)] to the decentralized
setting. Safe-codiagnosability captures the property that when a system executes a trace that
is faulty, there exists at least one diagnoser that can detect this within bounded delay and also
before the system behavior becomes “unsafe”. Necessary and sufficient conditions for safe-
104
aaa
aaε
εεa
fεε
((0,0),0,1) ((1,1),1,0)
((1,1),1,1) ((3,3),1,1)
((3,3),1,0)((2,2),0,1)
((0,0),0,0) ((2,2),0,0)
εεa,εba
aaε
aaa
aaε
aaε
εεa
bbb, bεb, εbε εbε
εbε
εbε
εεa,εba
(a) Safe specification R
S2
(b) Testing automaton T
S2 
= (G || R
S2
) x R x R
0 1
2 3 4
a
f
a
a
b
Figure 5.2 Safe specification model RS2 and testing automaton TS2
codiagnosability are established, showing that safe-codiagnosability can be separated into the
properties of codiagnosability together with “zero-delay codiagnosability” of “boundary safe
traces”. Algorithm with polynomial complexity is provided for verifying safe-codiagnosability.
For a safe-codiagnosable system, the same methods as those for a codiagnosable system are
applicable for the synthesis of local diagnosers as well as for on-line diagnosis using them.
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CHAPTER 6. Conclusion
6.1 Summarization of Dissertation
The main contributions of this dissertation on fault-tolerant supervisory control of discrete
event systems include:
1. In this dissertation, we propose the problem of fault-tolerant supervisory control. Given
a plant, possessing both faulty and nonfaulty behaviors, and a submodel for just the
nonfaulty part, the goal of fault-tolerant supervisory control is to enforce a certain spec-
ification for the nonfaulty plant and another (perhaps more liberal) specification for
the overall plant, and further to ensure that the plant recovers from any fault within a
bounded delay so that following the recovery the system state is equivalent to a nonfaulty
state (as if no fault ever happened). Formalizing this notion is the basis of the further
study of existence condition and synthesizing algorithms.
2. We formulate the notion of fault-tolerant supervisory control and provide a necessary
and sufficient condition for the existence of such a supervisor. This condition involves
the usual notions of controllability, observability and relative-closure, together with the
notion of state stability. Before putting effort on looking for a fault-tolerant supervisor,
the test of the existence of such supervisor is necessary. This condition provides us a tool
to check if it worths to exert ourselves to find a controlled subplant with fault tolerance.
3. We propose the problem of weakly fault-tolerant supervisory control. The conditions for
fault-tolerant supervisor are strong such that, in real life, most systems are not able to
achieve fault tolerance. Instead of recovering full functionality of the original system,
a weakly fault-tolerant supervisor will allow the controlled system to achieve partial
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functionality without violating safety specification. This problem is more realistic since
most real systems cannot recover full functionality after repair.
4. We formulate the notion of weakly fault-tolerant supervisory control and provide a nec-
essary and sufficient condition for the existence of such a supervisor. Failure of finding a
fault-tolerant supervisory may urge us to find a supervisor achieving weak fault tolerance.
With a weakly fault-tolerant supervisor, the controlled system will have a safe behavior,
and the controlled behaviors will always be a subset of the original nonfaulty behaviors,
such that all controlled behaviors are legal and no unsafe behavior will be performed.
5. As an extension, we introduce the notion of nonuniformly bounded fault tolerance. In
the previous problems, all recoveries are achieved in an uniformly bounded delay. The
nonuniformly bounded fault tolerance is an extreme situation of the previous problems.
The condition for nonuniformly bounded fault tolerance is even weaker than weakly fault
tolerance, but recovery is still guaranteed. This notion completes the formulation of fault
tolerance.
6. We observe the nonexistence of some faulty/nonfaulty fault-tolerant behaviors. We find
that neither the supremal nonfaulty fault-tolerant behavior nor the maximal nonfaulty
fault-tolerant behavior does not exist in general. This observation forces us to restrict
our attention to state-feedback based control, which gives us a direction in the design of
synthesizing algorithms.
7. We propose the formulation of optimal fault-tolerant control synthesis problem. In this
formulation, we set our goal in synthesizing the fault-tolerant supervisor. Here, ”optimal”
means the maximal nonfaulty behavior and minimal faulty behavior, which is reasonable
since after control we do not want to limit the normal nonfaulty behavior, but the faulty
recovery behavior should be as little as possible to prevent any possible violation of safety
specification.
8. We give the algorithm to synthesize an optimal fault-tolerant supervisor. When the exis-
tence condition mentioned above is not satisfied, this algorithm will result in a supervisor
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that maximizes the achievable nonfaulty behavior, minimizes the achievable faulty be-
havior and ensures safety, nonblockingness and bounded-delay recovery. The complexity
of this algorithm is quadratic in the size of the plant to be controlled.
The main contributions of this dissertation on decentralized/distributed failure diagnosis
of discrete event systems include:
1. We introduce the notion of safe-codiagnosability. The proposal of this notion is based
on the purpose to study the system property of being able to react safely to failure in a
decentralized setting. It is an extension of safe-diagnosability to the decentralized setting.
Safe-codiagnosability captures the property that when a system executes a trace that is
faulty, there exists at least one diagnoser that can detect this fault within bounded delay
and also before the system behavior becomes unsafe.
2. We establish the necessary and sufficient conditions for safe-codiagnosability. It shows
that the property of safe-codiagnosability can be seperated into the properties of codi-
agnosability with ”zero-delay codiagnosability” of ”boundary safe traces”.
3. We give an algorithm with polynomial complexity to verify safe-codiagnosability. This
algorithm is based on checking whether there exists a situation that violates the condition
of safe-codiagnosability. From the separation of safe-codiagnosability, the algorithm can
also be seperated into three parts that first checks the codiagnosability, then checks the
”boundary safe states”, and finally checks zero-delay codiagnosability. The complexity
of the algorithm is polynomial with respect to the size of the plant and specifications.
6.2 Future Research Topics
For the fault-tolerant supervisor control of discrete event systems, we provide an algorithm
to synthesize an optimal fault-tolerant supervisor. A future direction is the algorithm for
an optimal weakly fault-tolerant supervisor. First, a formalization of optimal fault-tolerant
supervisor control synthesis problem needs to be proposed. Since the weak fault tolerance is
defined on the basis of language stability, the definition of optimality will be based on supremal
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nonfaulty sublanguage and minimal faulty sublanguage. The design of the algorithm may use
the idea of our existed algorithm, if we can take the recovered faulty states (after which the
behaviors are subsumed by the behaviors after some nonfaulty states) as nonfaulty states and
apply the existed algorithm.
For some systems, it is hard to recover to normal system, but some degraded behaviors are
acceptable. If returning to the nonfaulty part is not achievable, the supervisor should direct
the system to those states with acceptable degraded faulty behaviors. Generally, preference
should be given to the states, a extended algorithm should be able to control the system to
reach the states with highest preference.
For the problems we study in this dissertation, all events are observable. That is, the
supervisor knows every transition in the system, therefore knows the current state of the
system. A possible future direction is to consider partial observability. In this case, the
occurrence of some events is not detectable. Since in real system, detecting sensors are not
able to detect all events, which makes this direction more reasonable. In this extension, the
supervisor will not be able to know the current state, which will make the achievement of fault
tolerance and safety more difficult.
All problems in this dissertation assume only one supervisor. Modern large systems al-
ways require the cooperation of multiple subsystems. Since ability of each single supervisor
is limited by hardware or software conditions, the large systems may need several controllers,
each of which is in charge of one part of the whole system. This motivates us to consider the
possibility of decentralized/distributed fault-tolerant control. In this decentralized/distributed
fault-tolerant control, each controller is responsible only to detect a portion of the whole ob-
servable events and can only control a portion of the whole controllable events. The fault
tolerance of the whole system is achieved by the cooperation of all the controllers.
Another possible extension of this dissertation is to consider time in the problem. In real-
time system, not only the sequence of the execution of the actions but also the timing is
critical. In this dissertation, we consider only untimed discrete event systems. To study real-
time system, we need to change our attention to timed discrete event systems. In this extension,
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the fault-tolerant supervisor will not only achieve fault tolerance but also meet certain real-
time deadlines by considering the timing properties in timed discrete event systems. That
is, all tasks should be finished before certain deadline is reached, which implies more limited
selection of enabled events.
The research in this dissertation may also be extended to hybrid system, which is currently a
popular research area. In a hybrid system, the system dynamics is described by both continuous
and discrete-event models. A simple example of the hybrid system is the embedded system
where both analog and digital inputs/outputs exist. Analog signals are usually described by
continuous model, while digital signals are usually described by discrete-event models. To
apply the theories developed in this dissertation, some abstraction techniques may be needed
for the continuous part. With a correct model, these discrete-event theories can be used to
control hybrid systems.
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